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I. INTRODUCTION: THE LEGAL LOGJAM AND THE NEED FOR A 
PRACTICAL, EFFECTIVE NON-LEGAL ALTERNATIVE 
“I can’t help feeling that there’s been a big mistake somehow.”1 
Reflecting on the recent activities of our national government, one 
may be tempted to echo the words of Thomas Jefferson Smith, the naïve 
and idealistic young senator in Frank Capra’s classic film, Mr. Smith 
Goes to Washington.  Such reflections are particularly apropos when it 
comes to the development of American arbitration law and the current 
state of binding (“mandatory”) arbitration agreements in consumer and 
employment contracts.  Consider the following facts: 
                                                          
* William H. Webster Chair in Dispute Resolution, Professor of Law, Pepperdine University 
School of Law; Academic Director, Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution.  The author wishes to 
extend thanks to the University of Kansas School of Law and the University of Kansas Law Review, 
which sponsored this symposium, Perspectives on the Current State of Arbitration Law, which 
helped inspire this “end run” around the legal logjam.  Although the opinions reflected herein are the 
author’s own, he is also indebted to a number of colleagues for useful suggestions and criticisms, 
including Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Chris Drahozal, Sally Greenberg, Paul Kirgis, Dave Lipsky, Jack 
McCrory, Amy Schmitz, Nancy Welsh, and to other members of the National Roundtable on 
Consumer and Employment Dispute Resolution, which met at Pepperdine on Feb. 2–4, 2012, and 
established a working group that will focus on this concept.  See Nat’l Roundtable on Consumer & 
Emp’t Dispute Resolution, Consumer Arbitration Roundtable Summary Report, AM. BAR ASS’N 
(Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-financial-protection-
bureau-launches-public-inquiry-into-arbitration-clauses/.  Thanks also to the American Bar 
Association Section of Dispute Resolution, which gave me the opportunity to co-facilitate 
discussions of the Consumer Arbitration Study Group in January, 2010, an important precursor to 
the Roundtable.  Special thanks are due to Gina McCoy, Research Librarian at Pepperdine 
University School of Law, and Shawn Davis, J.D., Masters in Dispute Resolution 2011, Pepperdine 
University School of Law, for their exceptional efforts in helping complete this article under extreme 
time pressures, as well as Sara Rosenblit and Maxfield Marquardt, J.D. candidates 2012, Pepperdine 
University School of Law, for additional research assistance. 
 1. MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia Pictures 1939). 
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1. Thanks to a series of increasingly expansive interpretations by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, a federal statute designed to promote 
private, choice-based alternatives to trial is now the vehicle 
for enforcing dense boilerplate language in mass-produced 
contracts to which “assent” is often fictional in all but the 
most formal sense.2 
2. State statutes and state common law surrounding 
enforceability of agreements are preempted by federal law 
involving interstate commerce, which means that legislatures 
and courts have very few tools to regulate arbitration 
agreements in adhesion contracts.3 
3. Contract defenses are the primary means by which courts 
regulate arbitration.4  The doctrine of unconscionability is 
judges’ primary tool for policing unfairness in arbitration 
agreements.5  The Supreme Court recently declared dramatic 
new limitations on judicial use of unconscionability defenses 
with respect to arbitration agreements.6 
4. Limitations on unconscionability defenses were reinforced by 
the Court’s strong support of “delegation” provisions that 
take away judicial oversight of arbitration agreements and 
give it to the arbitrators.7  Thus arbitrators, and not courts, 
will deal with issues of fairness, not only under the whole 
consumer or employment contract, but also within the 
arbitration agreement.8  Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson 
                                                          
 2. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, 
Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 328–30, 367–70, 
380–86 (2012) (discussing the Court’s interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)). 
 3. See id. at 328–30 (providing background on the FAA and its preemptive effects). 
 4. Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting 
Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 123 (2010). 
 5. See id. at 124–26 (providing examples of courts that did not enforce unconscionable 
arbitration clauses); infra text accompanying note 174. 
 6. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747–50 (2011) (use of 
unconscionability doctrine “stand[s] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the [FAA’s] 
objectives,” which is “to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms 
so as to facilitate informal, streamlined proceedings” (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 
U.S. 861, 872 (2000))); Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 380–87 (discussing use of unconscionability 
defenses to police the substantive terms of arbitration agreements in the wake of Concepcion). 
 7. See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777–78 (2010) (discussing the 
effects and enforceability of a delegation provision); see also Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 364–70 
(emphasizing the great impact of the Rent-A-Center decision). 
 8. See Rent-A-Ctr., 130 S. Ct. at 2778–79 (finding that unless the delegation provision 
specifically was challenged, it was enforceable, “leaving any challenge to the validity of the 
[arbitration] [a]greement as a whole for the arbitrator”); Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 368 (reasoning 
that this approach significantly restricts the judicial policing function and places greater 
responsibilities on the shoulders of private arbitrators). 
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has dramatically enhanced the possibility that arbitration will 
be “a hermetically sealed black box.”9 
5. Practically speaking, the only time consumers or employees 
may be able to raise concerns about procedural issues in 
arbitration is at the conclusion of the arbitration process with 
a motion to vacate.10  This, of course, creates a tremendous 
barrier for individuals.11  The recent Supreme Court decision 
in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel has reinforced limitations 
on judicial review.12 
6. The Court has also made arbitration agreements a vehicle for 
undercutting consumers and employees’ ability to take 
collective action through class arbitrations.13 
7. In our broadly polarized Congress, there seems to be little 
room for nuanced responses to these realities.  Most 
Democratic proposals are founded on the belief that binding 
arbitration under pre-dispute clauses is inherently unfair and 
should be outlawed in consumer and employment 
transactions.14  Currently, Congress is considering different 
versions of a proposed Arbitration Fairness Act that would 
effectively outlaw pre-dispute arbitration agreements in 
consumer, employment, and franchise agreements.  It would 
also outlaw arbitration provisions in brokerage agreements 
that are already subject to oversight and regulation by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).15  Republicans 
have sought to undo consumer legislation aimed at, among 
other things, closer review of the operation of arbitration  
under consumer financial services contracts and 
investor/broker contracts.16 
                                                          
 9. Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 370. 
 10. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1766 (2010) 
(discussing the district court and Second Circuit decisions on whether defendants’ motion to vacate 
should be granted). 
 11. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 367–70 (discussing the effect delegation provisions have 
on a court’s ability to protect weaker parties). 
 12. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008) (holding the grounds for 
judicial review of arbitration awards set forth in sections ten and eleven of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 10–
11 (2006), are the exclusive sources of judicial review under that statute). 
 13. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1755–56 (2011) (holding that the 
FAA preempted a California state law thus enforcing class action waivers); see also Stipanowich, 
supra note 2, at 375–76 (evaluating Concepcion’s impact on class actions). 
 14. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 396–404 (reviewing legislation). 
 15. See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation”, 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1, 40–49 (discussing these initiatives and their “spillover” into commercial (B2B) arbitration). 
 16. See, e.g., Laura Meckler & Victoria McGrane, Both Parties Seek Edge as Nominee Is 
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Meanwhile, binding arbitration agreements continue to be very 
widely used in consumer contracts17 and individual employment 
contracts.18  There is strong evidence that consumers do not read the fine 
print of arbitration agreements,19 and that they are predisposed to accept 
contracts that contain boilerplate arbitration terms for reasons that have 
nothing to do with their perceptions about the fairness or effectiveness of 
arbitration.20 
Because fundamental fairness hinges on many different 
characteristics of dispute resolution systems, arbitration programs may or 
may not provide an appropriate substitute for civil litigation.21  While, as 
discussed below, it is entirely possible for binding arbitration to 
effectively serve this role, there are also many ways in which private 
adjudication programs may fall short of public expectations about civil 
justice. 
First of all, people who find themselves in binding arbitration 
programs may have very little information about the rules and procedures 
under which they are expected to operate.22  They may have no idea 
about how to obtain a suitable arbitrator, the kind of hearing that may 
                                                                                                                       
Blocked, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2011 (discussing Republican attempts to rein in Dodd-Frank). 
 17. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 328 n.15 (citing FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, THE 
SURVEY OF CONSUMER PAYMENT CHOICE (Jan. 2010); URBAN JUSTICE CENTER, DEBT WEIGHT: 
THE CONSUMER CRISIS IN NEW YORK CITY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE WORKING POOR 3 (Oct. 2007), 
available at http://www.urbanjustice.org/pdf/publications/CDP_Debt_Weight.pdf (noting that 
binding arbitration agreements are widely used in credit card agreements and have also been utilized 
in debt collection cases); Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: 
Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 405, 411 (2007)). 
 18. See id. (observing that arbitration agreements in individual employment contracts “may 
affect as many as [fifteen to twenty percent] of employees” (citing Colvin, supra note 17, at 411)). 
 19. See Schmitz, supra note 4, at 134–36 (providing statistics from consumer studies on 
contract terms). 
 20. See id. at 130–33 (noting that some of those reasons may include fear of “raising thorny 
issues,” consumer’s need for products, and unfair bargaining power); FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND 
ARBITRATION 41–43 (2010) [hereinafter FTC STUDY] (stating that FTC roundtable participants 
suggested (1) that consumers do not understand arbitration and its implications and may not be 
aware of arbitration clauses in their contracts and (2) that consumers may not negotiate over 
arbitration because they may believe they have no alternatives among companies in an industry or 
because “time is of the essence” in purchasing goods or services). 
 21. See Developments in the Law—Access to Courts: III. Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: 
Proposals for Reform of Consumer-Defendant Arbitration, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1174–75 
(2009) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (examining two problems with consumer-defendant 
arbitration as bias “in favor of the repeat-player corporation” and disadvantage to “less-sophisticated 
consumer defendant[s]”). 
 22. See FTC STUDY, supra note 20, at 41–43 (discussing consumers’ understanding of 
arbitration). 
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occur, or the relief that may be obtained.  Besides undermining the 
notion of true assent to arbitration, all of these uncertainties place them at 
a distinct disadvantage at the outset.  There is, moreover, little, if any, 
evidence that companies promote or incentivize conscious choices 
regarding arbitration.23 
Second, there are legitimate concerns about the provenance of the 
arbitration program and the independence of the administrative 
framework under which arbitration is conducted.24  The notion that 
justice may be fairly and effectively dispensed under the auspices of a 
private corporation whose legal rights are at issue should strike 
reasonable people as absurd.  On various occasions, such programs have 
led a disapproving court to expose systemic bias or flaws in the 
programs’ designs25 or administration.26  As exemplified by the much-
publicized National Arbitration Forum,27 even some apparently free-
standing institutions that sponsor and administer arbitration programs 
may have real or perceived inherent conflicts of interest.28 
Third, there are concerns about arbitrators, the individuals whose 
decisions—awards—are largely immune to judicial reversal for errors of 
law or fact and hence more ironclad than court judgments or jury 
verdicts.29  Parties may reasonably ask, is my decision maker subject to 
pro-corporate or pro-employer bias?30  Am I disadvantaged because the 
                                                          
 23. See id. at 41–46 (discussing meaningful consumer choices and how consumers rarely 
exercise their options). 
 24. See id. at 51–54 (discussing perceptions and concerns regarding “forum bias” in debt 
collection arbitration). 
 25. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999) (describing 
employer-developed arbitration rules and procedures as a “sham”). 
 26. See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 922 (Cal. 1997) (holding 
that the health plan fraudulently misrepresented speed of its arbitrator selection process and engaged 
in dilatory conduct). 
 27. See FTC STUDY, supra note 20, at 39–40 (describing the 2009 suit filed by Minnesota 
Attorney General against the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), “then the leading debt collection 
arbitration forum,” alleging “consumer fraud, deceptive trade practices, and false advertising,” and 
subsequent settlement under which NAF agreed to cease arbitration of consumer debt collection 
disputes). 
 28. To quote an FTC report: “NAF purportedly held itself out as an impartial provider of 
dispute resolution while actually having financial ties to key members of the debt collection industry 
through a series of complex and purposefully hidden affiliations.”  Id. at 39. 
 29. See IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION 
ACT §§ 38–42 (1994) (discussing the procedures for and difficulty in vacating or overturning an 
arbitration award under the FAA). 
 30. See FTC STUDY, supra note 20, at 47–51 (discussing possible reasons for bias or perceived 
bias among arbitrators); Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 1174 (discussing concerns over 
pro-corporate arbitrators). 
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company is a repeat player in the system,31 my arbitrator cannot identify 
with me,32 or my arbitrator lacks the proper training and experience?33 
Fourth, there are concerns about arbitration procedures—the rules 
that define and give shape to the process of arbitration.  Especially in the 
absence of specified rules, either because no rules are specified in the 
agreement or because they cannot be obtained for review, parties to 
arbitration face many unanswered questions.  How much will it cost 
me?34  Will I receive adequate notice if a demand is filed against me?35  
May an attorney represent me?  Can I obtain critical documents or 
testimony?  What kind of a hearing am I entitled to and when and where 
will it be held?  How long will it take to obtain relief?  Can I bring a 
claim as part of a collective action by other consumers or employees?36  
If not, does the bar to class-wide relief effectively “chill” the 
environment for my claim?37 
Finally, there are concerns about the eventual outcome and the relief 
obtainable through arbitration.  Parties are rightly worried about 
limitations on remedies, especially statutory remedies such as treble 
damages and attorney fees.38  They may also prefer to have an award that 
                                                          
 31. See FTC STUDY, supra note 20, at 48–51 (discussing various perceptions and studies 
regarding “repeat player” bias); Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 1174–75; see also 
Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 424–25 & n.618. 
 32. See FTC STUDY, supra note 20, at 50 (discussing perceived need for balance and diversity 
in “rosters of arbitrators” maintained by arbitration forums for debt collection arbitration); see also 
Larry J. Pittman, Mandatory Arbitration: Due Process and Other Constitutional Concerns, 39 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 853, 862–65 (2011) (discussing need for diversity in arbitrator pool). 
 33. See, e.g., NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM. & AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, Principle 4, Reporter’s Comments (1997), available at 
http://www.adr.org (search for “Consumer Due Process Protocol”) [hereinafter CONSUMER 
PROTOCOL] (“While ensuring the competence of Neutrals is always important, it is particularly 
‘critical in contexts where party choice over the process, program or neutral is limited’ a reality of 
many Consumer ADR programs.” (citing SOC’Y OF PROF’LS IN DISP. RESOL. (SPIDR) COMMISSION 
ON QUALIFICATIONS, ENSURING COMPETENCE AND QUALITY IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE 5 
(1994); SPIDR COMM’N ON QUALIFICATIONS, PRINCIPLES CONCERNING QUALIFICATIONS, 
PRINCIPLE 3 (1989))). 
 34. See FTC STUDY, supra note 20, at 60–62 (discussing concerns regarding costs of arbitration 
to consumers). 
 35. See id. at 54–59 (discussing concerns about lack of effective notice to consumer-debtors 
regarding filing of arbitration demand by creditors). 
 36. See Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 1176 n.41; Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey 
P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Mandatory Arbitration for Customers but Not for Peers: A Study of 
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-Consumer Contracts, 92 JUDICATURE 118, 121 (2008) 
(noting that “[e]very consumer contract with a mandatory arbitration clause also included a waiver 
of the right to participate in class-wide arbitration”). 
 37. See Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 36, at 121–23 (discussing variations in type 
and content of contracts including arbitration clauses that prohibit class-wide relief). 
 38. See Richard A. Bales & Michelle Eviston, The Federal Arbitration Act Needs a Due 
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spells out the disposition of various claims and controversies as well as 
the rationale underpinning the decision.39 
What, one might ask, are we to do about this state of affairs?  As 
previously stated, regulation through the application of legislatively or 
judicially decreed legal norms is now severely inhibited under the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),40 and it is unclear what, if any, action 
may take place in Congress or in the Executive branch. 
There is, however, an as-yet unexplored opportunity to address all of 
the foregoing concerns while accomplishing other goals.  It can be 
readily implemented, and has the cardinal virtue of not being dependent 
on the actions of courts, legislatures, or agencies.  It also does not depend 
strictly upon how the Supreme Court or other tribunals view the legal 
acceptability of corporate conduct, but appeals directly to different 
standards of the marketplace.  It is, in short, a public rating system 
assessing the fairness of arbitration programs associated with contracts 
for consumer goods or services or individual employment contracts—
what we call an “Arbitration Fairness Index.” 
The Arbitration Fairness Index would be an “independent, 
standardized, third-party assessment”41 of arbitration clauses in specific 
corporate consumer contracts or individual employment agreements.  
Developed and implemented by a respected institution with broad-based 
input, perhaps coupled with highly visible ratings and rankings that hold 
up appropriate programs to public acclaim or shame, an Arbitration 
Fairness Index holds the promise of accomplishing numerous laudable 
goals: 
1. To represent the first broad-based effort to examine and bring 
to light a heretofore largely invisible aspect of consumer 
contracting. 
2. To serve as a forum for different interest groups to discuss 
fairness and effectiveness in adjudication without being 
distracted by attitudes toward contract law and policy. 
                                                                                                                       
Process Protocol, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., July 2010, at 16–17 (proposing that “the 
FAA should be amended to provide explicitly that arbitration agreements cannot waive statutory 
remedies”). 
 39. See FTC STUDY, supra note 20, at 62–64 (discussing concerns about lack of rationale 
supporting awards in debt collection arbitration and need for reasoned opinions). 
 40. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 328–30. 
 41. See Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law and 
Economics of Regulating Ratings Firms, 3 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 49, 87 (2007) (describing 
Underwriters Laboratories role as independent tester of product safety). 
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3. To draw broad public attention to arbitration programs and 
their workings as well as key differences between programs. 
4. To help acquaint and educate the public on class action 
waivers and other consumer or employee rights contract 
terms, and provide a basis for comparison among programs. 
5. To provide a more dependable and useful source of 
information than reports that employ selective data in 
isolation.  Instead of focusing on individual horror stories that 
may not be wholly representative of particular programs, the 
Index would comprehensively examine programs, and ratings 
would be based on many sources of information, including 
reports of personal experiences or statistics. 
6. To offer a more fulsome and accurate picture of arbitration 
programs in practice and potentially create a more balanced 
and nuanced public perception of arbitration programs. 
7. To put pressure on businesses to provide more information 
about their arbitration programs including rules and 
procedures, arbitration panels, administrative practices, and 
case statistics. 
8. To shed additional light on the policies and practices of 
organizations providing arbitration services—“arbitration 
forum[s]”42 or “provider organizations.”43 
9. To provide incentives to businesses and business sectors to 
develop and maintain fair, effective programs and more 
carefully weigh the cost of that “extra bite of the apple.” 
10.To help push the envelope by promoting actual incentives for 
consumers or employees to choose arbitration. 
11.To provide a potential foundation for the future efforts of 
courts, legislators, and other policymakers in ensuring the 
protection of individuals’ rights and, where appropriate, 
promoting effective punishment and deterrence.44 
                                                          
 42. See FTC STUDY, supra note 20, at 37 (employing nomenclature of “arbitration forum[s]”). 
 43. See generally CPR–GEORGETOWN COMM’N ON ETHICS & STANDARDS OF PRACTICE IN 
ADR, PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS (2002), available at http://www.cpradr.org/ 
Portals/0/Resources/ADR%20Tools/Tools/Principles%20for%20ADR%20Provider%20Organizatio
ns.pdf [hereinafter PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS] (employing nomenclature of 
“provider organization”). 
 44. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 427–32 (discussing potential alternatives to the current 
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The pervasive and important role of ratings and rankings in our 
society and the likely benefits of an Arbitration Fairness Index are 
discussed in Part II, along with a set of guidelines for developing and 
publishing ratings or rankings. 
Part III explores several existing norms that could provide the 
foundation for an Index.  These include positive legal standards such as 
revisions to the Uniform Arbitration Act and the California Ethics 
Standards, which are legally mandated disclosure requirements for 
arbitrators and arbitral institutions.45  Other norms include court 
decisions addressing fairness issues in arbitration under the FAA and 
state law.46  There are also due process standards developed by various 
groups in the 1990s and consumer and employment arbitration 
procedures incorporating and administered pursuant to these guidelines.47  
In addition, there are procedures and practices developed under regulated 
arbitration between securities investors and brokers.48  There is a wide 
range of “community standards”—such as the Principles for ADR 
Provider Organizations—aimed solely at the largely overlooked 
organizations “behind the neutral” that provide dispute resolution 
services.49  There is, moreover, the very thoughtful exploration of issues 
and perceptions regarding debt collection litigation and arbitration 
articulated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).50  Currently, there 
are groundbreaking efforts exploring the potential for online dispute 
resolution (ODR).51  Finally, there is a growing body of empirical 
research exploring consumers and employees’ experiences with and 
perceptions of arbitration processes.52 
Part IV offers a possible template for an Arbitration Fairness Index 
that would grade consumer and employment programs on each of 
twenty-three elements.  These elements are grouped under five general 
headings that correspond to key concerns about arbitration: (1) 
Meaningful Consent, Clarity, and Transparency; (2) Independent and  
                                                                                                                       
scheme of binding arbitration in consumer and employment disputes). 
 45. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 46. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 47. See infra Part III.B. 
 48. See infra Part III.D. 
 49. See infra Part III.E. 
 50. See infra Part III.F. 
 51. See infra Part III.G. 
 52. See infra Part III.H. 
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Balanced Administration; (3) Quality and Suitability of Arbitrators; (4) 
Fair Process; and (5) Fair Outcomes. 
Part V examines other issues that must be addressed to effectively 
implement an Arbitration Fairness Index.  While the publication of an 
Index promises to provide numerous benefits to the public, such a system 
also entails costs that someone must bear.  To be meaningful and 
effective, a rating system must be perceived as thoughtfully and fairly 
conceived and administered by a trustworthy and respected body.53  The 
information that is fed into the rating process must be reliable, accurate, 
and fairly representative.54  Finally, ratings must be presented in visible, 
accessible, and useful formats in order to exert influence on the 
marketplace.55 
II. BACKGROUND: POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF AN ARBITRATION FAIRNESS 
INDEX 
A. Living by the Numbers: Our Ratings-Driven Culture 
For better or worse, we live in a world driven by ratings and 
rankings, with rating firms operating in nearly every sector of our 
economy.56  We read Consumer Reports to assess the relative quality and 
characteristics of consumer goods57 and look for an Underwriters 
Laboratories seal as certification of product safety testing.58  We consult 
guides published by Michelin59 or Zagat60 before deciding where to eat.  
Grades from the Better Business Bureau give us a rough gauge of 
business quality and ethics.61  Students and their families scrutinize the 
                                                          
 53. See infra Part V.A. 
 54. See infra Part V.B. 
 55. See infra Part V.C. 
 56. See Furchtgott-Roth, Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 41, at 84, 94 (listing various sources 
of ratings for different industries). 
 57. See id. at 94 (listing Consumer Reports as a source for financial industry ratings and 
rankings); Our Mission, CONSUMER REP., https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/aboutus/mission/ 
overview/index.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2012). 
 58. See Furchtgott-Roth, Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 41, at 87 (noting that “[t]he product 
safety industry is dominated by Underwriters Laboratories”); About UL, UL, http://ul.com/global/ 
eng/pages/corporate/aboutul/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (listing many statistics indicating the breadth 
and number of products certified by Underwriters Laboratories). 
 59. See Red Guides, MICHELIN, http://www.michelintravel.com/guides-cat/red-guides/ (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2012); see also Furchtgott-Roth, Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 41, at 82–83. 
 60. See Welcome to ZAGAT.com!, ZAGAT, http://www.zagat.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2012). 
 61. See Vision, Mission and Values, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, http://www.bbb.org/us/BBB-
Mission/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).  Even the organizations that provide rankings are not above 
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rankings in U.S. News & World Report to guide choices among 
undergraduate, business, law, and other professional schools.62  
Concerned parents can check the Motion Picture Association of America 
ratings on movie content,63 while film attendance is spurred by the 
Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences’ sign of approval—the 
Oscars64—and discouraged by the mirror-opposite, the Razzies, which 
hold up purportedly bad films to public scorn.65  Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch are touchstones for investors in bond markets,66 
and recent S&P downgrades of U.S. and European government debt have 
had a dramatic impact.67  Advertisers rely on Nielsen Media Research 
                                                                                                                       
being ranked themselves.  A recent Consumer Reports article cautioned: “When viewing a BBB 
report, don’t put a lot of credence in a high letter grade or in BBB accreditation.  But do pay 
attention to a low grade; it could be a sign of real trouble.”  Can You Trust the Better Business 
Bureau?, CONSUMER REP., Aug. 2011, at 10, 11. 
 62. See Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://www.usnews.com/rankings (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2012) (reporting rankings for the “Best Colleges” and “Best Graduate Schools”); U.S. News 
Staff, Why U.S. News Ranks Colleges and Universities, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 12, 2011), 
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/articles/2011/09/12/why-us-news-ranks-colleges-
and-universities-2012 (explaining that U.S. News & World Report ranks colleges and universities “to 
help [students] make one of the most important decisions of [their] li[ves].”). 
 63. See Film Ratings: Informing Parents, Protecting Artistic Freedom, MOTION PICTURE ASS’N 
OF AM., http://mpaa.org/ratings (last visited Mar. 7, 2012). 
 64. See Eva Deuchert, Kossi Adjamah & Florian Pauly, For Oscar Glory or Oscar Money?: 
Academy Award and Movie Success, 29 J. CULTURAL ECON. 159, 172 (2005) (“[P]eople take the 
Oscar nominations and awards as a signal . . . .”); About the Academy Awards, ACAD. OF MOTION 
PICTURE ARTS & SCI., http://www.oscars.org/awards/academyawards/about/index.html (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2012). 
 65. See THE RAZZIES, http://www.razzies.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2012); John Mars, ‘They 
Have No Excuse To Be As Bad As They Are,’ GUARDIAN, Feb. 24, 2009, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2009/feb/24/razzies-interview-oscars (noting the Razzies probably 
boost DVD sales because they “‘make people aware of films they wouldn’t have gone to the cinema 
to see’”). 
 66. Furchtgott-Roth, Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 41, at 76–77, 79–80; About Us: Moody’s 
Investors Service, MOODY’S CORP., http://www.moodys.com/Pages/atc.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 
2012); Browse Ratings by Practice, STANDARD & POOR’S, http://www.standardandpoors.com/ 
ratings/en/us/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2012); FITCH RATINGS, http://www.fitchratings.com/web/en/ 
dynamic/fitch-home.jsp (last visited Mar. 7, 2012). 
 67. See, e.g., Nicholas Hastings, FOREX FOCUS: Impact of S&P’s Downgrade Spreads Far 
and Wide, DOW JONES INT’L NEWS, Jan. 16, 2012 (discussing impact of S&P’s credit downgrade of 
France and other European countries, including likely credit rating downgrade of European Financial 
Stability Facility); Alice Ross, Euro Falls on EFSF Downgrade, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2012, at 24 
(“The euro failed to recover ground against the dollar following sharp falls on Friday after Standard 
& Poor’s, the rating agency, announced downgrades to various European countries including France 
and Austria.”); Jonathan Cheng, U.S. Stocks Drop, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424052970204542404577158320667664132.html (reporting that U.S. stocks 
dropped in anticipation of the credit downgrade of several European countries).  Cf. Simon Kennedy, 
Zeke Faux & John Detrixhe, S&P Downgrades See Muted Market Response, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 18, 
2012, 12:17 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-18/s-p-gets-no-respect-from-investors-
accepting-lower-yields-after-downgrades.html (“The fallout in financial markets has been muted.”). 
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ratings to decide where and when to plump down television advertising 
dollars.68  Reputationally concerned companies and socially and 
environmentally concerned citizens pay increasing attention to Corporate 
Social Responsibility rankings, such as the Corporate Social 
Responsibility Index (CSRI), which ranks public perceptions of 
companies’ social and environmental citizenship, general governance, 
and employee relations.69 
Rating systems often provide useful standards of comparison 
between products or services and facilitate more efficient transactions 
between buyers and sellers; they may also help overcome informational 
asymmetries.70  In some cases, a reliable superior rating by a rating 
firm—such as an Underwriters Lab label—obviates the need for a 
consumer to obtain independent information about the quality or 
character of a product or service.71 
Ratings can have a big impact on the profitability of affected 
companies and organizations.  For example, companies look to Nielsen 
ratings to determine the value of advertising time and develop strategies 
for reaching specific demographic groups.72  Other examples illustrate 
how ratings can have a more immediate and direct financial effect on 
certain types of companies.  Oscar nominations and awards can 
significantly increase box office revenues.73  Likewise, upward 
movement for colleges and universities in the U.S. News rankings 
generally corresponds to an increase in applications, admissions, and, for 
public institutions, state funding.74 
                                                          
 68. See Furchtgott-Roth, Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 41, at 52 n.11 (citing Nielsen Media 
Research, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.nielsen.com/us/en.html) (noting that although a 
television show may have millions of viewers, it may still be unpopular). 
 69. See BOSTON COLL. CTR. CORP. CITIZENSHIP & REPUTATION INST., THE 2011 CSRI 50 
(2011), http://www.bcccc.net/pdf/CSRIReport2011.pdf (showing the 2011 index). 
 70. See Furchtgott-Roth, Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 41, at 82–83 (offering an example of 
consumer credit agencies and other rating firms). 
 71. See id. at 83 & n.156. 
 72. See id. at 52. 
 73. See Deuchert, Adjamah & Pauly, supra note 64, at 172 (“Our analysis of the ‘Oscar effect’ 
on revenues suggests that while the awards have a positive effect, the main box office effect is 
generated primarily by the nominations.”); Randy Nelson et al., What’s an Oscar Worth?, 39 ECON. 
INQ. 1, 15 (2001) (“[A] nomination or award for the ‘top’ prizes, such as best picture and 
actress/actor, generally has a positive impact on a film’s probability of survival, its market share of 
screens, and the average revenue per screen . . . .”); Heesun Wee, Investment Tips From Oscar?, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 21, 2002, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/ 
mar2002/nf20020321_6409.htm (“[O]ne of the most tangible benefits of awards and nominations is 
higher ticket sales. . . . [A]n Oscar nomination for Best Actor or Best Picture can add anywhere from 
5% to 10% in additional box-office receipts for a studio.”). 
 74. See Nicholas A. Bowman & Michael N. Bastedo, Getting on the Front Page: 
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To the extent they are perceived by subject corporations as legitimate 
and powerful instrumentalities that impact corporate reputation, rating 
systems are likely to provoke a response.75  Corporate reputation is now 
recognized as a primary business driver, and the great majority of 
international companies now have some internal system for taking stock 
of their corporate reputation.76  Most companies monitor and take into 
consideration “media coverage, industry rankings and analyst 
commentary,” and CEOs tend to be particularly sensitive to criticism in 
the media.77  Globally, as many as 180 published lists purport to assess 
one or more dimensions of, or factors affecting, corporate reputation.78  
One helpful ranking tool is the CSRI, which was developed by the 
Reputation Institute79 in conjunction with the Boston College Center for 
Corporate Citizenship80 “to understand how companies’ reputations are 
affected by public perceptions of performance related to citizenship (the 
                                                                                                                       
Organizational Reputation, Status Signal, and the Impact of U.S. News & World Report on Student 
Decision, 50 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 415, 415–17 (2009) (demonstrating an increase in undergraduate 
admissions indicators as a result of U.S. News and World Report rankings); Marc Meredith, Why Do 
Universities Compete in the Ratings Game?  An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of the U.S. News 
and World Report College Rankings, 45 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 443, 443–44, 459–60 (2004) 
(concluding “college rankings affect admission outcomes”); Robert J. Morse, The Real and 
Perceived Influence of the US News Ranking, 33 HIGHER EDUC. EUR. 350, 350 (2008) (noting 
rankings appear to influence education policy at the state level, resulting in a boost in expenditures); 
see also Michael Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do Rankings Matter? The Effects of U.S. News & 
World Report Rankings on the Admissions Process of Law Schools, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 105, 127–
32 (2006) (reporting similar findings for law schools). 
 75. See Amy E. Randel, Kimberly S. Jaussi & Stephen S. Standifird, Organizational Responses 
to Negative Evaluation by External Stakeholders: The Role of Organizational Identity 
Characteristics in Organizational Response Formulation, 48 BUS. & SOC’Y 438, 441 (2009), 
available at http://bas.sagepub.com/content/48/4/438 (summarizing scholarly support for concept 
that stakeholder influence on organizations is enhanced by “power, legitimacy and urgency”). 
 76. Andrew Pharoah, Corporate Reputation: The Boardroom Challenge, 3 CORP. GOV. 46, 46–
51 (2003) (summarizing results of 2002 Hill and Knowlton Corporate Reputation Watch survey of 
“800 chief executives and senior managers” in the United States, Canada, and parts of Europe). 
 77. Id. at 48. 
 78. The Reputation Institute collects many of these rankings as part of its service to companies 
and others that use its consulting services.  See Reputation Rankings Database, REPUTATION INST., 
http://www.reputationinstitute.com/knowledge-center/list-of-lists (last visited Mar. 7, 2012). 
 79. The Reputation Institute describes itself as “the leading international organization devoted 
to advancing knowledge about corporate reputations and to providing professional assistance to 
companies interested in measuring and managing their reputations proactively.”  About RI, 
REPUTATION INST., http://www.reputationinstitute.com/about-reputation-institute (last visited Mar. 
7, 2012).  Founded in 1997, the Institute conducts annual survey interviews with tens of thousands of 
consumers in countries around the world regarding corporate reputation.  Id. 
 80. The Center for Corporate Citizenship is a “membership-based research organization.”  
About Us, BOSTON COLL. CTR. FOR CORP. CITIZENSHIP, http://www.bcccc.net/index.cfm (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2012).  The Center “work[s] with global corporations to help them define, plan and 
operationalize their corporate citizenship.”  Id. 
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community and the environment), governance (ethics and transparency), 
and workplace practices.”81  According to an executive at the Center for 
Corporate Citizenship, “‘Reputation . . . is an indicator of how strongly 
connected consumers are to a brand.  The effectiveness of a company’s 
reputation management will influence the bottom line—in either a 
positive or negative manner.’”82  The CSRI is compiled annually from 
data collected from online surveys, and it measures and publishes the 
perceptions of the practices of more than 200 major companies in the 
three social responsibility dimensions.83 
Ratings may also be valuable to policymakers.  For example, ratings 
have been used by those seeking to “defin[e] markets for antitrust or 
regulatory purposes.”84 
B. Benefits of an Arbitration Fairness Index 
1. Shining Light on Arbitration 
Boilerplate language in standardized agreements that binds parties to 
arbitration is an arcane and poorly understood aspect of consumer 
contracting and of employment relationships.85  Consumers and 
employees may have little or no idea about what a commitment to 
binding arbitration entails because only the tip of the arbitration 
“iceberg” may be visible to the eye at the time of contracting.86  They 
may not have access to the text of incorporated procedures and details 
                                                          
 81. Tim Wilson, Publix Super Markets, Google and UPS Top List of 50 U.S. Companies with 
Best CSR Reputations, CTR. NEWS & FEATURES BLOG (Oct. 5, 2011, 12:39 PM), 
http://blogs.bcccc.net/2011/10/publix-super-markets-google-and-ups-top-list-of-50-u-s-companies-
with-best-csr-reputations/. 
 82. Id. (quoting Katharine V. Smith, Executive Director of the Carroll School of Management 
Center for Corporate Citizenship at Boston College). 
 83. Id.; see also THE 2011 CSRI 50, supra note 69; BOSTON. COLL. CTR. CORP. CITIZENSHIP & 
REPUTATION INST., THE 2010 CORP. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY INDEX (2010), http://www.bcccc.net/ 
pdf/CSRIReport2010.pdf. 
 84. Furchtgott-Roth, Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 41, at 52. 
 85. See Schmitz, supra note 4, at 134–36, 156–60 (noting that consumers typically care less 
about contract provisions that do not relate to price or quality and emphasizing that consumers may 
not understand arbitration terms altogether); see also FTC STUDY, supra note 20, at 41–42. 
 86. See Schmitz, supra note 4, at 149 (“[M]ost of the arbitration terms reviewed in the credit 
card and wireless service contracts were buried in long form contracts, and often appeared in 
unnoticeable or small typeface . . . [or] were slipped in ‘bill stuffers’ or included in e-contracts 
accessible only through website links or ‘pop-ups’ that consumers could easily bypass or overlook.” 
(citing Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet Retail 
Contracting, 20–24 (Univ. of Tex. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 104, 2007))); id. at 145 (noting 
credit card companies “rarely include or make available their full form contract terms”). 
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regarding the administrative framework and panels of prospective 
arbitrators.  Even if they did, very few have either the time or the ability 
to discern the import of specific procedures or potential loss of due 
process.87  These realities are exacerbated by many individuals’ belief 
that there is no point in trying to avoid or alter a company’s arbitration 
provision,88 or the privacy enshrouding these processes and the 
reluctance of some to submit program data to public gaze.89 
A carefully developed Arbitration Fairness Index, scrutinizing and 
providing multi-faceted ratings of arbitration programs in consumer 
contracts or employment agreements would shine much-needed light on 
the nether worlds of consumer and employment arbitration.90  The Index 
would draw heavily upon legal standards, as well as due process 
protocols, securities arbitration procedures developed under the auspices 
of the SEC, and other norms.  The Index, however, would avoid some of 
their limitations.  Creating the Index—gathering data on and analyzing 
the operation of arbitration under specific contracts—would be a 
valuable tool for discussion and debate about fairness in arbitration, but 
without some of the distractions associated with legislative debates, such 
as political games, philosophical differences, and normative arguments 
over contract law and policy.91 
The Index would draw broad public attention to arbitration programs 
and explain their workings.  It would help acquaint and educate the 
public regarding the impact of class action waivers92 and other terms on 
                                                          
 87. See id. at 150 (“[C]onsumers’ eyes are likely to glaze over attempting to read and decipher 
companies’ terms even when consumers get the opportunity to review advance copies.” (citing 
Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 
161–78 (2007))). 
 88. See FTC STUDY, supra note 20, at 43 (“Consumers generally do not negotiate or try to 
negotiate the arbitration provisions . . . because they may not believe they have any alternative given 
that all of the companies in the relevant industry . . . have arbitration provisions in their contracts.”); 
Schmitz, supra note 4, at 129 (“[C]onsumers rarely negotiate boilerplate that they may not read or 
understand.” (citing Todd D. Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1235, 1240–43 (2006))); id. at 152 (noting a belief of a focus group participant that she did not have 
the “leverage to negotiate” a change to a form contract). 
 89. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 422. 
 90. See FTC STUDY, supra note 20, at 67–71 (discussing the need for more information about 
consumer arbitration cases and dispositions and supporting monitoring and evaluation of debt 
collection arbitration programs). 
 91. The history and continuing evolution of arbitration between investors and brokers to debate 
and formulate policies and procedures under the eye of the SEC illustrates the potential benefits to 
be derived by gathering a group of experienced, thoughtful, and articulate representatives of 
respective stakeholders (e.g., employers and employees, producers of goods and services, and 
consumers).  See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 384–85. 
 92. Studies examining arbitration provisions in consumer contracts have found that these 
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consumer or employee rights.  It would provide many points of 
comparison among programs.  Consumers and employees could thus 
understand how a particular company’s arbitration program stacks up in 
the same way they obtain multifaceted comparisons of other products or 
services by reading Consumer Reports.93 
The Index would also serve as a more dependable and useful source 
of information than reports that employ selective data in isolation.94  
Instead of focusing on individual horror stories, which may not be 
wholly representative of particular programs,95 the Index would examine 
programs in all of their aspects.  Ratings would be based on a variety of 
sources of information, including reports of personal experiences and 
statistics. 
The Index would offer a more fulsome and accurate picture of 
arbitration programs in practice, and potentially create a more balanced 
and nuanced public perception of arbitration programs.  There is, for 
example, some evidence that parties are more likely to get to a hearing in 
arbitration than in court.96  In the securities arena, there is evidence that 
arbitration provides the preferred—and perhaps the only feasible—path 
                                                                                                                       
provisions are invariably paired with class-action waivers.  See Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra 
note 36, at 121 (finding that all contracts studied include such waivers); Schmitz, supra note 4, at 
148 (same).  The presumption is that companies provide for mandatory arbitration simply as a way 
to prohibit collective action in a manner that would probably survive judicial scrutiny.  See 
Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 36, at 122 (noting such clauses seek “to prevent 
aggregation of consumer claims”); Schmitz, supra note 4, at 148; see also Jean R. Sternlight, 
Tsunami: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 91 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012) (manuscript at 15–17).  Many of the contracts studied provided that the arbitration was void in 
the event class arbitration was ordered, thus funneling any collective action to the courts.  See 
Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 36, at 122; Schmitz, supra note 4, at 148. 
Class-action waivers are the subject of much controversy, Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 336, 
371, 425 & n.72, particularly since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  See infra text accompanying notes 427–37. 
 93. See supra text accompanying note 57. 
 94. See, e.g., Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer 
Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1051 (2009) (extensively critiquing the 
analysis and conclusions of the 2007 Public Citizen report entitled, “The Arbitration Trap: How 
Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers”). 
 95. See, e.g., id. at 1059, 1061 (criticizing the report for relying on anecdotal evidence where 
statistical data is lacking). 
 96. See, e.g., Bales & Eviston, supra note 38, at 10 (noting that opponents of the Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2009 argue that employees “are more likely to prevail” in arbitration than in court 
because of the reduced emphasis on motions to dismiss and summary judgment in arbitration); SECS. 
INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, WHITE PAPER ON ARBITRATION IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 31–33 
(2007), available at www.sifma.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=21334 (parties to securities 
arbitration are, among other things, more likely to see their claim decided on the merits after full 
factual discovery). 
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for certain kinds of investor claims.97  The same may be true of some 
employment claims.98 
To the extent the Index imposes appropriate downgrades for 
companies that fail to share required information regarding their 
arbitration programs, including rules and procedures, arbitration panel 
members, administrative practices, and case statistics,99 the Index could 
stimulate a great deal more transparency in corporate practices.  
Moreover, the Index would shed additional light on the policies and 
practices of organizations providing arbitration services under corporate 
contracts.  As explained below, enhanced awareness and scrutiny of 
these largely unregulated private justice-providers is long overdue.100  In 
these respects the Index would transcend some of the inherent limitations 
of due process protocols and other fairness standards, which in many 
cases depend to a great extent on the good faith and commitment of 
companies and organizations providing consumer or employment 
arbitration services.101 
2. Other Potential Benefits 
In addition to enhancing public awareness and understanding 
consumer and employment arbitration programs, the Arbitration Fairness 
                                                          
 97. See, e.g., Barbara Black, Is Securities Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 25 PACE L. REV. 1, 2 
(2004) (“[I]nvestors may fare better in arbitration than in litigation.”); Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns 
Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 517–20 (2008) 
(concluding “as a result of SEC oversight, investors have access to a fundamentally fair dispute 
resolution process that enables them to vindicate their statutory rights to the same degree as, if not 
more so, than in court”). 
 98. See, e.g., Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights?, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003–Jan. 
2004, at 58 (“[P]laintiffs with employment claims are well served by arbitration relative to the 
federal courts, both in terms of speedy justice and the likelihood of a positive outcome.”). 
 99. Failure to provide the information necessary to rate the fairness of an arbitration program 
could result in a lower rating.  For example, when colleges fail to fill out the statistical surveys, U.S. 
News & World Report relies on estimates or other sources to fill in the gaps.  See Robert Morse & 
Sam Flanigan, How U.S. News Calculates the College Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 
(Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/articles/2011/09/12/how-us-news-
calculates-the-college-rankings-2012.  Some have claimed that these estimations result in a lower 
ranking than if the schools had provided the data.  MICHAEL SAUDER & WENDY ESPELAND, FEAR OF 
FALLING: THE EFFECTS OF U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT RANKINGS ON U.S. LAW SCHOOLS 5 
(2007), available at http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/Research/GR/GR-07-02.pdf. 
 100. See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Behind the Neutral: The Critical Role of Provider 
Institutions, in AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
47 (Thomas Carbonneau & Jeanette A. Jaeggi eds., 2010) (discussing the positive influence 
providers can have on the conflict resolution process). 
 101. See infra text accompanying notes 224–28. 
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Index would undoubtedly impact corporate behavior.  It would provide 
incentives to businesses and business sectors to develop and maintain 
fair, effective arbitration programs for consumers and employees.  The 
Index would discourage companies from employing proprietary (in-
house, self-administered) programs102 as well as provisions that limit 
remedies and procedures that would otherwise be available.103  The Index 
may also help push the envelope by encouraging companies to provide 
tangible incentives for consumers or employees to choose arbitration. 
Finally, implementing an Arbitration Fairness Index would provide a 
more solid foundation for the future development of arbitration law and 
policy.104  A more complete picture of consumer and employment 
arbitration and particularly troublesome cases may support new 
approaches to statutory reform or regulatory action.105  Whether one 
supports the enforcement of arbitration agreements as a way of ensuring 
the protection of individuals’ rights through compensatory or specific 
relief, or believes, additionally, that arbitration programs must permit—if 
not effectively promote—appropriate punishment and deterrence,106 a 
greater understanding of the structure and functioning of arbitration 
programs is essential.  In addition, the very process of developing and 
implementing an Arbitration Fairness Index will engender a valuable 
conversation about how arbitration serves, or should be made to serve, 
different kinds of justice—distributive, retributive or corrective, 
procedural, and compensatory. 
C. Guidelines for Developing an Arbitration Fairness Index 
A useful set of guidelines for the development of ranking systems 
emerged from the global dialogue regarding rankings of institutions of 
higher education by U.S. News & World Report and other journals.107  In 
                                                          
 102. See infra Part IV.C. 
 103. See, e.g., infra Part IV.F.1. 
 104. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 427–33 (describing potential process options for future 
resolution of consumer or employment disputes). 
 105. See id. at 396–406 (summarizing recent or proposed legislation affecting arbitration, 
including the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011 and regulatory authority granted to the new Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the SEC). 
 106. See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of 
Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1997) (addressing concerns regarding availability of exemplary 
damages in arbitration). 
 107. See COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY RANKING SYSTEMS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND 
AMERICAN CHALLENGES 2–4 (2007) [hereinafter RANKING SYSTEMS]; Rankings, supra note 62. 
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2004, an International Rankings Expert Group (IREG) was formed to 
bring together individuals from around the world who create rankings or 
evaluate rankings programs.108  IREG developed The Berlin Principles 
on Ranking of Higher Education Institutions,109 a framework for the 
development and publication of higher education rankings that are 
intended to promote “continuous improvement and refinement of . . . 
ranking [systems].”110  The Berlin Principles include several 
considerations that are particularly relevant to the development of an 
Arbitration Fairness Index, to wit: 
Purposes and Goals of Rankings[:] 
1. . . . Rankings can provide comparative information and improved 
understanding [of the rated programs but should be viewed as 
complementary to other sources of information].111 
2. . . . Rankings have to be designed with due regard to their 
purpose . . . .112 
3. . . . Institutions that are being ranked and the experts that inform the 
ranking process should be consulted often. . . .113 
4. [Rankings should p]rovide clarity about the range of information 
sources for rankings.114  [A variety of courses should be combined] 
in order to get a more complete view . . . .115 
5. Specify the linguistic, cultural, economic, and historical contexts of 
the educational systems being ranked. . . .116 
Design and Weighting of Indicators[:] 
6. Be transparent regarding the methodology used for creating the 
rankings. . . .117 
                                                          
 108. IREG was established at a meeting co-hosted by the Institute for Higher Education Policy 
(IHEP) and the UNESCO European Centre for Higher Education (UNESCO-CEPES).  RANKING 
SYSTEMS, supra note 107, at 2–3. 
 109. Id. at 51. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 52. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 117. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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7. Choose indicators according to their relevance and validity. . . .118 
8. Measure outcomes in preference to inputs whenever possible. . . .119 
9. Make the weights assigned to different indicators (if used) 
prominent . . . .120 
Collection and Processing of Data[:] 
10. [B]e . . . objective and impartial [in the collection and use of 
data].121 
11. Use audited and verifiable data whenever possible. . . .122 
12. Include data that are collected with proper procedures for scientific 
data collection. . . .123 
13. Apply measures of quality assurance to ranking processes 
themselves. . . .124 
14. Apply organizational measures [such as advisory or supervisory 
bodies] that enhance the credibility of rankings. . . .125 
Presentation of Ranking Results[:] 
15. Provide consumers with a clear understanding of all the factors used 
to develop a ranking, and offer them a choice in how rankings are 
displayed.126 
The remainder of this Article is devoted to the development and 
implementation of an Arbitration Fairness Index, with some emphasis on 
the criteria listed above.  In light of our purpose of developing a rating 
system aimed at providing consumers and employees with “comparative 
information and improved understanding”127 about the relative attributes 
and implications for fairness of corporate arbitration programs, we will 
                                                          
 118. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 119. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 120. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 121. Id. at 53. 
 122. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 123. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 124. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 125. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 126. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 127. Id. at 4. 
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first consider various standards and programs that might serve as 
exemplars suggesting the kinds of elements—or, to use the term in the 
Berlin Principles, “indicators”128—that would be most relevant and valid 
in a comprehensive rating system. 
III. ANALYSIS: EXEMPLARS AND FOUNDATIONS FOR AN ARBITRATION 
FAIRNESS INDEX 
A rating system should reflect general “agreement on what needs to 
be measured” and what standards should be applied.129  When it comes to 
elements of fairness in employment and consumer arbitration programs, 
fortunately, there is a wide array of relevant and mutually reinforcing 
exemplars from a growing variety of sources.  We have pertinent 
legislation,130 numerous court decisions regarding fairness in arbitration 
under consumer or employment contracts,131 “due process protocols” the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) developed with input from 
other stakeholders and translated into administered procedures,132 
“minimum fairness standards” adopted by JAMS,133 procedures and 
practices established by the Better Business Bureau,134 a robust 
framework for investor/broker arbitration overseen by the SEC,135 
principles to govern institutions providing arbitration and other dispute 
resolution services,136 and recent findings and recommendations by the 
FTC respecting arbitration of debt collection disputes.137  Moreover, and 
most importantly, are initiatives to establish a framework for the global 
implementation of online dispute resolution—the engine that promises to 
vastly transform our experience with and expectations regarding dispute 
resolution.138 
In addition to these standards or programs that suggest parameters or 
“inputs” for an Arbitration Fairness Index, there are empirical studies 
that attempt to capture the range of actual contracting behaviors in 
                                                          
 128. See id. 
 129. See Furchtgott-Roth, Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 41, at 86. 
 130. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 131. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 132. See infra Part III.B. 
 133. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 134. See infra Part III.C. 
 135. See infra Part III.D. 
 136. See infra Part III.E. 
 137. See infra Part III.F. 
 138. See infra Part III.G. 
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consumer and employment arbitration agreements and also measure 
outcomes of consumer and employment arbitration processes.139  These 
outcomes include not only win-loss rates in arbitration and their 
comparison to statistics from court systems,140 but also summaries of 
perceptions of arbitration processes by consumers and other users.141 
These developments—nearly all products of the last two 
decades142—may be viewed through the lens that defines and measures 
arbitration as an engine of compensatory justice—that is, the fair 
compensation of injuries by those who caused them.143  To a significantly 
lesser degree such a view also embodies concepts of arbitration as a 
source of retributive or corrective justice.144  This is best illustrated by 
court decisions, legislation, rules of arbitration procedure, and other 
standards recognizing the authority of arbitrators to award punitive or 
exemplary damages in the manner of a court.145  These latter concerns—
when manifested in the view that arbitration cannot be an effective 
vehicle for punishment and deterrence—help animate opposition to class 
action waivers in arbitration agreements.146 
These same initiatives and empirical findings about arbitration may 
also be considered from the perspective of social or distributive justice—
that is, fair, or perceptibly fair, adjudicated outcomes for individuals 
regardless of their relative power or bargaining strength.147  These 
                                                          
 139. See infra Part III.H. 
 140. See infra text accompanying note 293–94. 
 141. See infra text accompanying notes 290 and 295. 
 142. See infra Part III.H. 
 143. See Richard W. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 625, 671 (1992) 
(“Compensatory justice is the principle whereby faulty injurers who cause such unjust losses are 
required to rectify those losses.”). 
 144. “Retribution” is defined as an “aspect of justice that requires the return of harm for harm.”  
BRIAN H. BIX, A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL THEORY 186 (2004); see also Morton Deutsch, Justice and 
Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY & PRACTICE 43, 51 (Morton 
Deutsch, Peter T. Coleman & Eric C. Marcus eds., 2d ed. 2006) (“The psychology of retributive and 
reparative justice is concerned with the attitudes and behavior of people in response to moral rule 
breaking.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62–64 (1995) 
(holding punitive damages permissible under an arbitration agreement but not under this particular 
agreement); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 21(a) (amended 2000) (“An arbitrator may award punitive 
damages or other exemplary relief if such an award is authorized by law in a civil action involving 
the same claim and the evidence produced at the hearing justifies the award under the legal standards 
otherwise applicable to the claim.”). 
 146. See Sternlight, supra note 92, at 23–24 (describing the necessity of class actions to protect 
plaintiffs’ rights and deter defendants “from engaging in illegal conduct”). 
 147. See Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from 
Procedural and Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49, 55–56 (2004) [hereinafter Welsh, 
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standards represent efforts to adjust the playing field for private 
adjudication under standardized contracts of adhesion in which consent 
by consumers or employees is often neither informed nor free, while 
empirical studies reflect the breadth of actual practice and resulting 
perceptions. 
Finally, the following initiatives and studies exemplify the 
indisputable link between views on outcomes in justice systems and the 
key component of procedural justice—whether “a dispute resolution 
process is procedurally fair.”148  These components include: (1) the 
opportunity for a disputant to express views or to tell his or her story—
“‘an opportunity for voice’”—to a third party;149 (2) the ability of a third 
party—in this case, presumably, the arbitrator and perhaps the arbitration 
institution—to “demonstrate[] consideration of what the disputants have 
said”;150 (3) “the [requirement that a] third party treat[] the disputants in 
an even-handed way and tries to be fair”;151 (4) “the [requirement that a] 
third party treat[] the disputants with dignity and respect”;152 and (5) the 
assurance that the process itself is dignified.153  Much hinges on these 
perceptions.154 
A. Legal Standards Affecting Consumer and Employment Arbitration 
1. Legislation 
Despite the fact that the FAA has been interpreted to be broadly 
preemptive of state legislation limiting the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements,155 some state legislatures have established special formal 
                                                                                                                       
Remembering the Role of Justice] (discussing “merging” of social and procedural justice under John 
Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected 
Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 787, 817 (2001) [hereinafter 
Welsh, Making Deals] (“Distributive justice . . . focuses on perceptions of and criteria to determine 
the substantive fairness of . . . outcomes themselves.”). 
 148. See Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice, supra note 147, at 52 (discussing the elements 
that lead people to conclude whether “a dispute resolution process is procedurally fair”). 
 149. Id. (citing Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 147, at 820–22, 841–44). 
 150. Id. (citing Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 147, at 820–23). 
 151. Id. (citing Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 147, at 821–24). 
 152. Id. (citing Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 147, at 820–26). 
 153. Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 147, at 820. 
 154. See generally id. at 820–30 (discussing elements of procedural fairness, consequences of 
perceived procedural fairness, and theoretical underpinnings of procedural fairness). 
 155. See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008) (“The FAA’s displacement of conflicting 
state law is ‘now well-established.’” (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 
272 (1995))); see also Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 328–30 (discussing the Supreme Court’s ruling 
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requirements intended to promote greater awareness or understanding of 
arbitration agreements.  The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act 
(RUAA)156 and the California Ethics Standards157 stand out as examples 
of such efforts to promote due process in other ways. 
When the Uniform Arbitration Act158—the primary model for state 
arbitration law in the United States—was revised by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 2000 (RUAA), 
it was greatly expanded and fleshed out to provide more detailed 
direction for courts and, to some extent, arbitrators.159  Concerns about 
the rights of consumers and employees brought into arbitration under 
standardized contracts were a prime motivator of reforms.160  Hence, the 
RUAA incorporates many additional procedural default rules and several 
mandatory and non-waivable procedural elements.161  Among other 
things, the Act expressly requires disclosures by arbitrators;162 sets 
requirements for notice of hearings;163 gives all parties the right to have a 
lawyer present;164 specifically authorizes arbitrators to issue subpoenas, 
request depositions, and partake in arbitrator-supervised discovery;165 
and permits a wide range of remedies, including punitive damages and 
attorney’s fees as authorized by law.166  By making these elements more 
explicit, and in some cases non-waivable, the drafters sought to promote 
various requirements of due process.167 
Some years ago the California Arbitration Act was modified to 
require arbitrators and organizations providing consumer arbitration 
                                                                                                                       
in Stolt-Nielsen that interpreted Congress’ power to preempt state law under the FAA). 
 156. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (amended 2000). 
 157. CAL. ETHICS STANDARDS FOR NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS IN CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION 
(2007), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ethics_standards_neutral_arbitrators.pdf. 
 158. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (1956) (amended 2000). 
 159. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT Prefatory Note (amended 2000); see also Stipanowich, supra 
note 15, at 20–21 (“When the RUAA . . . was published in 2000, it incorporated many new elements 
that reflect the ‘legalization’ of arbitration.”). 
 160. Id. at 44.  The author speaks from personal knowledge.  He was one of two official 
academic advisors to the NCCUSL study committee working with the Reporter, was present at most 
of the meetings of the committee, and assisted in drafting the revisions. 
 161. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 4 (amended 2000) (detailing the non-waivable elements of 
the RUAA that did not exist in the original UAA). 
 162. Id. § 12. 
 163. Id. § 15(c). 
 164. Id. § 16. 
 165. Id. § 17(a)–(c). 
 166. Id. § 21(a)–(b). 
 167. See id. Prefatory Note. 
STIPANOWICH FINAL.DOC 8/2/2012  11:31 AM 
2012] THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS INDEX 1009 
services to make disclosures relating to possible conflicts of interest.168  
Enacted as the California Ethics Standards,169 these provisions also were 
stimulated by concerns regarding consumer and employment 
arbitration.170  Among other things, the Standards require arbitrators to 
disclose “all matters that could cause a person aware of the facts to 
reasonably entertain a doubt that the proposed arbitrator would be able to 
be impartial.”171  Importantly, the Standards also call upon organizations 
providing consumer arbitration services in California to make broad 
disclosures.172  This has had the beneficial effect of requiring provider 
organizations to make public a wide range of data regarding consumer 
and employment cases they have administered.  As a result, institutions 
such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and Judicial 
Arbitration and Mediation Service (JAMS) have made public extensive 
data collected from arbitrations conducted not just in California but 
throughout the nation.173 
2. Judicial Decisions 
Federal and state court decisions policing arbitration agreements 
offer another set of guideposts for describing and evaluating the fairness 
of arbitration programs.  Under legal concepts such as fraud, the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations, and above all, the unconscionability doctrine,174 courts 
have delineated a variety of due process elements.  These elements 
                                                          
 168. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.85 (West 2007). 
 169. CAL. ETHICS STANDARDS, supra note 157. 
 170. See Jevne v. Superior Court, 111 P.3d 954, 962 (Cal. 2005) (citing Cal. Assembly Comm. 
on Judiciary, Analysis of Senate Bill No. 475, S. 475, 107th Cong. (2001)); Jay Folberg, Arbitration 
Ethics—Is California the Future?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 343, 343–44 (2003). 
 171. CAL. ETHICS STANDARDS, supra note 157, Standard 7(d). 
 172. In arbitrations administered by a provider organization that involve a consumer, 
employment, or healthcare contract, arbitrators are required to disclose any financial or professional 
relationships between the provider organization and any party, lawyer, or law firm involved in the 
arbitration.  Id. Standards 2(d)–(e), 8(b)(1)(A).  If such a relationship exists, the arbitrator must also 
disclose his or her relationship with the provider organization.  Id. Standard 8(c). 
 173. See, e.g., Consumer Arbitration Statistics, AM. ARB. ASS’N, available at 
http://www.adr.org/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (search for “Consumer Arbitration Statistics”) 
[hereinafter Consumer Arbitration Statistics] (providing arbitration-related statistics for California 
and other states); JAMS Disclosures for California and Washington, D.C. Consumer Arbitrations, 
JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/consumer-arbitration-disclosures/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) 
[hereinafter JAMS Disclosures] (providing ADR data for California). 
 174. For a review of the use of the unconscionability doctrine to police unfairness in arbitration 
agreements before and after AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, see Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 
351–60, 380–87. 
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include: a fair, balanced program under pre-dispute agreements for 
binding arbitration;175 materially accurate information to the public 
regarding program operation;176 impartial and independent arbitrators;177 
a hearing location that is reasonably close;178 reasonable costs and 
fees;179 adequate access to information and discovery;180 remedies that 
                                                          
 175. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938–40 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that arbitration agreement was unenforceable because Hooters’ arbitration rules and procedures were 
“so one-sided that their only possible purpose [wa]s to undermine the neutrality of the proceeding” 
and “creat[e] a sham system unworthy even of the name of arbitration”). 
 176. See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 922 (Cal. 1997) (concluding 
“there is evidence to support [plaintiff’s] claims that [defendant] fraudulently induced [plaintiff] to 
enter the arbitration agreement in that it misrepresented the speed of its arbitration program”). 
 177. See, e.g., Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 385–88 (6th Cir. 
2005) (holding, inter alia, that arbitration agreements were unenforceable because the forum did not 
allow for the effective vindication of plaintiffs’ rights, and the arbitral forum provided was not 
neutral because employer and third-party agency responsible for designating arbitrators had a 
“symbiotic relationship”); McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 492–94 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that an employer’s termination appeal procedure was not “an effective substitute for a judicial 
forum” where employer had “unilateral control over the pool of potential arbitrators”). 
 178. See, e.g., Fields v. NCR Corp., 683 F. Supp. 2d 980, 989–90 (S.D. Iowa 2010) (finding 
arbitration procedures—including a provision that the hearing “be ‘conducted at a neutral location, 
in or near the [employee’s city]’”—were fair and “[did] not impose any substantial inequities or 
hardships on an employee that might seek arbitration thereunder”); Dale v. Terminix Int’l Co., No. 
B162108, 2003 WL 22511633, at *2–3 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2003) (“[B]ecause [the arbitration 
provision] guarantees that any arbitration hearing will be near [plaintiff]’s residence, we find it to be 
reasonable.”). 
 179. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding 
that the arbitration agreement was “valid and enforceable” because “[plaintiff] could not be required 
to agree to arbitrate his public law claims as a condition of employment if the arbitration agreement 
required him to pay all or part of the arbitrator’s fees and expenses”); Nazon v. Shearson Lehman 
Bros., Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1540, 1543 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding agreement to arbitrate where plaintiff 
had to initiate the claim and pay applicable fees was nonetheless reasonable because plaintiff could 
apply for a fee waiver); Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267, 277 (Ct. App. 2003) (“We 
conclude that where a consumer enters into an adhesive contract that mandates arbitration, it is 
unconscionable to condition that process on the consumer posting fees he or she cannot pay.  It is 
self-evident that such a provision is unduly harsh and one-sided, defeats the expectations of the 
nondrafting party, and shocks the conscience.  While arbitration may be within the reasonable 
expectations of consumers, a process that builds prohibitively expensive fees into the arbitration 
process is not.” (footnote omitted) (citing Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
563 (Ct. App. 1993))). 
 180. See, e.g., Openshaw v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 2d 987, 995 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010) (holding, inter alia, arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable because “the 
discovery provision [favored defendant] while stacking the deck against a contractor seeking to 
establish liability for wrongful termination,” which “[w]hether by design or effect, . . . denie[d] 
contractors a fair opportunity to develop the evidence necessary to support their claims”); Ostroff v. 
Alterra Healthcare Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 538, 545–46 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (holding an arbitration 
agreement substantively unconscionable because discovery was limited to expert depositions, which 
would have made it impossible for plaintiff to support many of her claims for relief under the facts 
of the case); Fitz v. NCR Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88, 97–100, 101–05 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that 
the arbitration agreement’s limitation on discovery did not permit the fair vindication of rights in an 
arbitral forum and hence the agreement was procedurally and substantially unconscionable). 
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would be available in a court of law;181 and access to information about 
related cases.182 
The most contentious issue of all involves class-action waivers in 
connection with arbitration agreements;183 courts have divided on their 
enforceability.184  Recently, the Supreme Court ruled that such waivers 
are enforceable, at least in certain circumstances.185  Whatever the 
current state of the law, however, the option of class or collective action  
may be perceived as a critical element of fairness for consumers and 
employees. 
B. The Due Process Protocols 
Concerns about privatized justice under adhesion contracts also 
prompted the development of what are effectively self-regulatory 
guidelines by organizations providing dispute resolution services.186  
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the AAA and other organizations engaged 
in collaborative efforts aimed at establishing minimum standards for the 
management of employment,187 consumer188 and health care,189 and debt 
                                                          
 181. See, e.g., Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1105 (W.D. Mich. 
2000) (holding an arbitration agreement excluding class action, declaratory, and injunctive remedies, 
which would be otherwise available through state statute, did so impermissibly and, thus, was 
substantively unconscionable); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 143–46, 152 (Ct. 
App. 1997) (holding arbitration agreement procedurally and substantively unconscionable because it 
denied or limited the recovery of remedies that would have remained available through litigation). 
 182. See, e.g., Davis v. O’Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding a 
confidentiality clause of an arbitration agreement unconscionable because it limited the ability of 
claimaints to pursue their claims and interview witnesses); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151–52 
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an arbitration agreement confidentiality clause was substantively 
unconscionable). 
 183. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 336. 
 184. See id. at 336 & n.70. 
 185. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–51 (2011).  For a discussion of 
Concepcion, see Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 371–96. 
 186. To some extent, “self-regulation bolsters the perceived legitimacy” of consumer and 
employment arbitration.  See Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 
185, 225 (2006). 
 187. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1995), available at 
http://www.adr.org (search for “Employment Due Process Protocol”) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT 
PROTOCOL] (“The following protocol is offered . . . as a means of providing due process in the 
resolution by mediation and binding arbitration of employment disputes involving statutory rights.”). 
 188. See CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33 (containing fifteen principles to ensure a fair 
ADR process for consumers). 
 189. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMM’N ON HEALTH CARE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 
HEALTHCARE DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1998), available at http://www.adr.org (search for 
“Healthcare Due Process Protocol”) [hereinafter HEALTHCARE PROTOCOL]. 
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collection disputes.190  The Employment Due Process Protocol and the 
more expansive Consumer Due Process Protocol were the first 
significant efforts to create a common floor of expectations for a 
fundamentally fair dispute resolution process.  They served as templates 
for the AAA’s employment and consumer arbitration procedures and 
heavily influenced other providers’ initiatives.191 
1. Employment Due Process Protocol 
In 1993, the Dunlop Commission observed that arbitration under 
collective bargaining agreements was fair because unions’ collective 
power counterbalanced employers’ power; the Commission expressed 
concern that this balance did not exist in arbitration under contracts with 
non-union employees.192  “The Commission then asked the National 
Academy of Arbitrators” to develop standards for such scenarios, and a 
Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution, comprised of 
representatives of diverse constituencies, was assembled for that 
purpose.193 
The participants in the Task Force were of differing minds regarding 
the appropriateness of enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements in 
individual employment contracts.  Therefore, they reflected a number of 
varying perspectives on the issue.194  They nevertheless reached 
consensus on key due process elements of employment arbitration, 
including: the right of representation, access to information and 
discovery, qualified arbitrators, arbitrator disclosures of conflicts of 
interest, and arbitrator authority to render the same relief as a court.195  
The resulting Protocols became the template for employment arbitration 
procedures at two leading dispute resolution provider institutions,196 the 
AAA197 and JAMS.198 
                                                          
 190. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, NAT’L TASK FORCE ON THE ARB. OF CONSUMER DEBT 
COLLECTION DISPUTES, CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL-STATEMENT OF 
PRINCIPLES (2010), available at http://www.adr.org (search for “Debt Collection Due Process 
Protocol”) [hereinafter DEBT COLLECTION PROTOCOL]. 
 191. See infra text accompanying notes 192–234. 
 192. See Bales & Eviston, supra note 38, at 11; Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process 
Protocol at Ten: Twenty Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 165, 171 (2005). 
 193. See Bales & Eviston, supra note 38, at 11–12; Bales, supra note 192, at 171–72. 
 194. See EMPLOYMENT PROTOCOL, supra note 187, at 1. 
 195. See id. at 2–4. 
 196. See Bales, supra note 192, at 174. 
 197. See id.; see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES & 
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2. Consumer Protocols 
The AAA subsequently convened a broad-based advisory committee 
comprised of consumer advocates, providers of goods and services, 
representatives from state and federal agencies, academics, and others to 
consider developing due process guidelines for resolution of consumer 
disputes.199  Like its predecessor, the group was unable to agree as to 
whether pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer contracts should 
be enforced as a matter of policy, but it nevertheless successfully 
developed standards for arbitration and mediation processes associated 
with consumer contracts.200  Although it carries forward many of the 
elements of the Employment Protocol, the Consumer Due Process 
Protocol moves beyond the Employment Protocol in several important 
ways.  It consists of fifteen principles,201 each of which embodies the 
foundational concept of “fundamentally-fair ADR process” expressed in 
Principle 1.202  It admonishes sellers of goods or services to “undertake 
reasonable measures to provide [c]onsumers with full and accurate 
information regarding Consumer ADR Programs” and states that 
consumers should receive “all information necessary” regarding 
arbitration.203  It calls not only for independent and impartial neutrals, but 
also for administration of ADR programs by an “Independent ADR 
Institution,”204 which performs many key functions including 
                                                                                                                       
MEDIATION PROCEDURES (2009), available at http://www.adr.org (highlight “Rules & Procedures,” 
then click “Search Rules”). 
 198. See JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION MINIMUM STANDARDS OF 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (2009), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/ 
JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Employment_Min_Stds-2009.pdf [hereinafter JAMS POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT 
ARBITRATION].  The Policy states that “JAMS supports the application of the ‘Due Process Protocol 
for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out Of The Employment Relationship’ 
to arbitrations based on condition-of-employment clauses” and, further, that the “JAMS Arbitration 
Rules and Procedures for Employment Disputes are consistent with the Due Process Protocol.”  Id.; 
see also JAMS, JAMS EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES (2009), available at 
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_employment_arbitration_ 
rules-2009.pdf. 
 199. See Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 369, 405 (2004) (citing Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 
WIS. L. REV. 831, 896).  The author was appointed Academic Reporter for the project and served as 
a facilitator of discussion among advisory committee members as well as the primary drafter for the 
Protocol and accompanying commentary. 
 200. See CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Scope of the Consumer Due Process. 
 201. See generally id. 
 202. Id. Principle 1. 
 203. Id. Principle 2 (emphasis omitted). 
 204. Id. Principle 3. 
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“establishing and maintaining standards for [n]eutrals.”205  It also calls 
for processes to be conducted at reasonable cost,206 at a reasonably 
convenient location,207 and within a reasonable time.208 The Protocol also 
allows consumers, as well as companies, to retain the right to bring 
claims of the appropriate nature and amount in small claims court.209  
The Consumer Due Process Protocol also goes well beyond the 
Employment Protocol in another respect: the basic principles are 
supplemented and explained by extensive Reporter’s Comments 
discussing pertinent case law and contemporary standards governing 
arbitration and mediation, as well as practical suggestions for those 
implementing the Protocol.210 
The Consumer Due Process Protocol became the template for the 
AAA Consumer-Related Disputes Supplementary Procedures.211  The 
Consumer Due Process Protocol strongly influenced the Healthcare Due 
Process Protocol,212 which mirrors many of its predecessors’ key due 
process elements, such as: the right to a fundamentally fair process; 213 
access to information regarding the process;214 a neutral, independent, 
and qualified arbitrator;215 and a fair hearing conducted at a reasonable 
location and within a reasonable time.216  The Health Care Protocol was 
distinctive in taking the particularly significant step of acknowledging 
that “[i]n disputes involving patients, binding forms of dispute resolution  
                                                          
 205. Id. Principle 4 (emphasis omitted). 
 206. Id. Principle 6. 
 207. Id. Principle 7. 
 208. Id. Principle 8. 
 209. Id. Principle 5. 
 210. See, e.g., id. Principle 1, Reporter’s Comments.  The Reporter’s Comments remain a 
singularly useful set of guideposts for addressing procedural fairness in arbitration. 
 211. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES SUPPLEMENTARY 
PROCEDURES (2005), available at http://www.adr.org (Search for “Consumer-Related Disputes 
Supplementary Procedures”).  The AAA has the discretion to apply these supplementary procedures 
in disputes between individual consumers and businesses involving a product or service for personal 
or household use where the boilerplate arbitration agreements are non-negotiable.  See id. at 2. 
 212. See Harding, supra note 199, at 407.  The Commission responsible for the Healthcare 
Protocol was formed following the California Supreme Court’s criticism of Kaiser Permanente’s 
mandatory arbitration program in Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, “at a time when serious 
questions were raised about the appropriateness of using arbitration for the resolution of health care 
disputes.”  Id. at 407 & n.219 (citing Margaret A. Jacobs, American Arbitration Association to 
Change Policy on Health Care, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1998, at B5). 
 213. HEALTHCARE PROTOCOL, supra note 189, Principle 1. 
 214. Id. Principle 2. 
 215. Id. Principle 4–5. 
 216. Id. Principle 7–8. 
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should be used only where the parties agree to do so after a dispute 
arises.”217 
In the wake of recent controversies regarding the use of binding 
arbitration provisions in debt collection cases, the AAA convened a 
National Task Force on the Arbitration of Consumer Debt Collection 
Disputes to develop the Debt Collection Due Process Protocol as a 
supplement to the Consumer Due Process Protocol.218  Ten additional 
principles reflect the Task Force members’ effort to make the arbitration 
process “substantially more accessible and easier for debtors to navigate 
than the current court process for debt collection litigation.”219 
JAMS developed its own Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant 
to Pre-Dispute Clauses Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness.220  
The JAMS Policy addresses most of the same procedural concerns as the 
Consumer Due Process Protocol but uses different language.221  JAMS 
                                                          
 217. Id. Principle 3. 
 218. See DEBT COLLECTION PROTOCOL, supra note 190, at 2, 7. 
 219. Id. at 5.  Additional due process protections in debt collection arbitrations include the 
following requirements: (1) “[a]rbitration should be commenced in a manner that provides 
substantial certainty that the debtor will receive the notice”; (2) notice “should be delivered in a 
manner that reflects an effort to communicate in a way that would normally result in a substantial 
certainty that the debtor will receive the communication”; (3) communication should be in plain 
English, or the primary language of the consumer where known; (4) demands for arbitration should 
include sufficient information to establish a claim; (5) “[p]rocedures should be implemented to 
identify claims that, at the time of filing, are beyond the applicable statute of limitations or are 
otherwise time-barred”; (6) the process for answering the demand “should be simplified”; (7) 
“[a]rbitrators should be appointed in a manner that enhances the perception of their neutrality”; and 
(8) participation in arbitration “should take ample advantage of technology and other means of 
allowing parties to participate in the arbitration process.”  Id. at 7–11. 
 220. JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS PURSUANT TO PRE-DISPUTE CLAUSES 
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (2009), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/ 
consumer-arbitration/ [hereinafter JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS]. 
 221. See id. The JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations sets forth the following “minimum 
standards for arbitration procedures”: 
1. The arbitration agreement must be reciprocally binding on all parties such that: A) if a 
consumer is required to arbitrate his or her claims or all claims of a certain type, the 
company is so bound; and, B) no party shall be precluded from seeking remedies in 
small claims court for disputes or claims within the scope of its jurisdiction. 
2. The consumer must be given notice of the arbitration clause.  Its existence, terms, 
conditions and implications must be clear. 
3. Remedies that would otherwise be available to the consumer under applicable federal, 
state or local laws must remain available under the arbitration clause, unless the 
consumer retains the right to pursue the unavailable remedies in court. 
4. The arbitrator(s) must be neutral and the consumer must have a reasonable 
opportunity to participate in the process of choosing the arbitrator(s). 
5. The consumer must have a right to an in-person hearing in his or her hometown area. 
6. The clause or procedures must not discourage the use of counsel. 
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also included a specific requirement of mutuality—requiring both parties 
to be bound to arbitrate the same kinds of disputes222—and a provision 
recognizing special limitations under California law on cost-shifting to 
consumers.223 
3. Enforcing Protocols and Standards 
The Employment and Consumer Protocols and similar standards 
reflect the potential benefit that can come from providers’ and 
stakeholder groups’ cooperative efforts.  Of course, written due process 
standards that are not translated into procedural rules for arbitration and 
subject to ongoing enforcement amount to nothing more than window 
dressing.  When incorporated into specific arbitration procedures that are 
actively and effectively administered by an independent institution to 
ensure conformance with institutional requirements, however, there is 
evidence that such standards can enhance the real and perceived fairness 
and effectiveness of arbitration as an alternative to trial for consumers 
and employees.224 
Notably, the AAA has made efforts to require companies that 
incorporate AAA procedures in consumer or employment contracts to 
comply with its procedures;225 JAMS has similar policies.226  The AAA’s 
                                                                                                                       
7. With respect to the cost of the arbitration, when a consumer initiates arbitration 
against the company, the only fee required to be paid by the consumer is $250, which 
is approximately equivalent to current Court filing fees.  All other costs must be borne 
by the company including any remaining JAMS Case Management Fee and all 
professional fees for the arbitrator’s services.  When the company is the claiming 
party initiating an arbitration against the consumer, the company will be required to 
pay all costs associated with the arbitration. 
8. In California, the arbitration provision may not require the consumer to pay the fees 
and costs incurred by the opposing party if the consumer does not prevail. 
9. The arbitration provision must allow for the discovery or exchange of non-privileged 
information relevant to the dispute. 
10. An Arbitrator’s Award will consist of a written statement stating the disposition of 
each claim.  The award will also provide a concise written statement of the essential 
findings and conclusions on which the award is based. 
Id. 
 222. See id. 
 223. See id. 
 224. See Harding, supra note 199, at 402–04 (noting protection for employees from “one-sided 
arbitration clauses”). 
 225. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, FAIR PLAY: PERSPECTIVES FROM AMERICAN ARBITRATION 
ASSOCIATION ON CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 33 (2003) (“[T]he AAA has adopted 
a policy that it may decline to offer its administrative services in consumer cases, and in employment 
cases arising from employer-promulgated ADR plans, where arbitration provisions do not comply 
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Protocol-influenced procedures appear to have produced tangible 
positive results when effectively put into practice, as reflected in 
empirical studies of employment disputes conducted under the AAA.227  
A recent independent investigation of AAA-administered consumer 
credit cases by a task force of Northwestern University’s Searle Civil 
Justice Institute supports the conclusion that consumer-debtors prevailed 
more often in debt collection actions in AAA-administered debt 
collection arbitration than in court, and creditor recovery rates tended to 
be lower than, or comparable to, recovery rates in court.228 
                                                                                                                       
with due process protocols applicable to those caseloads.  Employers and companies wishing to use 
AAA services for such cases are asked to obtain advance review by AAA of the program to 
determine compliance with the protocols.”); Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private 
Regulation of Consumer Arbitration 44–45 (U. Kan. Sch. of L., Working Paper No. 2011-4, 2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1904545 (discussing empirical findings on AAA’s enforcement 
of the Consumer Due Process Protocol). 
 226. The JAMS Policy on Employment Arbitration addresses compliance with the policy in a 
practical way, as follows: 
If JAMS becomes aware that an arbitration clause or procedure does not comply with the 
Minimum Standards, it will notify the employer of the Minimum Standards and inform 
the employer that the arbitration demand will not be accepted unless there is full 
compliance with those standards.  In assessing whether the standards are met and whether 
to accept the arbitration assignment, JAMS, as the ADR provider, will limit its inquiry to 
a facial review of the clause or procedure.  If a factual inquiry is required, for example, to 
determine compliance with Minimum Standards, it must be conducted by an arbitrator or 
court. 
JAMS POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION, supra note 198, at 4. 
 227. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sharaf, Employment Arbitration Before and After the 
Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of 
Employment: Preliminary Evidence That Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATIVE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 303 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwin eds., 2004) 
(identifying positive results after arbitration); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and 
Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003/Jan. 2004, 
at 44, 53 (concluding that at least arbitrators “participating in AAA-sponsored arbitration” do “not 
act[] in a materially different fashion than in-court adjudicators”); see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, 
ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact of “Alternative Dispute Resolution”, 1 J. 
OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 904–05 (2004) (citing empirical studies whose results reflect 
positive arbitration outcomes).  But see Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment 
Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 21 (2011) (“Estimates 
of employee win rates and damage award amounts based on the AAA-CC filings data indicate that 
arbitration outcomes are generally less favorable to employees than those from employment 
litigation.”). 
 228. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Creditor Claims in Arbitration and in 
Court, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 102–03 (2011). 
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4. Due Process Standards in Proposed Legislation 
The Protocols prefigured and influenced proposals for statutory due 
process standards to govern consumer and employment arbitration under 
the FAA.229  One proposed set of standards, the Model Arbitration Act 
for Employment and Consumer Disputes,230 calls for the FAA to be 
amended to require, among other things: 
1. “the right to representation by representatives of their own choosing 
at all stages of the proceeding”; 
2. “the right to all legal and equitable remedies that would have been 
available in a court of law”; 
3. a “time limit for filing a claim . . . no shorter than the applicable 
statute of limitations”; 
4. arbitral “authority to order any and all discovery that he or she 
believes is needed and appropriate to render a fair decision;”231 
5. “duty [of the arbitrator] to disclose any relationship that might 
reasonably constitute or be perceived as a conflict of interest”; 
6. “a [n]eutral [arbitrator] who is free of bias toward either party”; 
7. “equal rights in selecting the arbitrator”; 
8. “costs of arbitration, including the arbitrator’s fee and any 
administration fees (but not legal fees) [to be borne by the company 
                                                          
 229. See Stipanowich supra note 2, at 427–28.  A number of cogent arguments have been 
advanced for legislated standards.  Judicial decisions “fleshing out” the FAA and state arbitration 
statutes have resulted in a lack of uniformity in the enforcement of arbitration agreements, leaving 
companies, consumers, and employees uncertain as to what kinds of arbitration agreements will pass 
muster.  See Schmitz, supra note 4, at 163.  Legislated due process standards could afford a 
generally more effective framework for ensuring fundamental fairness in arbitration, providing 
significantly enhanced guidance for drafters of arbitration agreements as well as courts policing 
fairness in arbitration.  Such standards would avoid the stark dilemma confronting consumers or 
employees who are required to wait until after an arbitration award has been rendered to raise issues 
of fundamental fairness.  For example, a rule that sets effective limits on arbitration costs and fees in 
specified categories of contracts, such as a requirement that arbitration filing fees do not exceed 
otherwise applicable court filing fees, would prevent affected individuals from having to prove that 
arbitration-related costs are actually prohibitive.  See Bales & Eviston, supra note 38, at 18. 
 230. MODEL ARBITRATION ACT (Proposed Draft 2010) (Submitted by Lew Maltby) (on file with 
author). 
 231. The proposed Act states: “Arbitrators are urged to use this authority in a manner that 
expedites the resolution of the dispute and discourages excessive costs or delay or unduly 
burdensome demands.”  Id. 
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and not the employee or consumer], except that the employee or 
consumer may be required to pay an amount equal to the filing fee 
in court in the appropriate jurisdiction” (with the voluntary option 
of paying up to half the expenses); 
9.  “fair and impartial administration”; “[a]rbitration rosters established 
and maintained on a non-discriminatory basis, diverse by gender, 
ethnicity, and background”; 
10. “[u]pon the request of either party . . . a written [arbitration 
award] . . . provid[ing] a reasoned explanation of how the decision 
was reached”; and, 
11. “[i]n the case of face-to-face proceedings, . . . proceedings . . . 
conducted at a location which is reasonably convenient to both 
parties with due consideration of their ability to travel and other 
pertinent circumstances.”232 
Significantly, the Model Act also calls for express recognition of the 
availability of class actions for parties “under circumstances in which 
they are necessary for the parties to be able to vindicate their legal 
rights.”233  To the extent this gives parties the option of pursuing 
collective or class-wide relief in court as an alternative to pursuing an 
individual action in arbitration, it is consistent with policy and practice in 
the realm of Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) securities 
arbitration discussed below.234 
C. Better Business Bureau Standards and Procedures 
Once the Consumer Due Process Protocol was published, the 
Council of Better Business Bureaus (BBB) also announced a policy 
regarding “pre-dispute, binding arbitration clauses in consumer 
contracts” that call for arbitration pursuant to Better Business Bureau 
Rules of Arbitration.235  The BBB policy emphasizes “fair notice to the 
                                                          
 232. Id.  Lew Maltby proposed the Model Act as an alternative to the Arbitration Fairness Act, 
incorporating recommendations from Professor Amy J. Schmitz’s article, Regulation Rash? 
Questioning the AFA’s Approach for Protecting Arbitration Fairness, 28 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES 
POL’Y REP., Oct. 2009, at 16.  See Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration 
Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 
496–97 (“Professor Schmitz asserted that the need for some form of arbitration, particularly in the 
consumer context, must be balanced against the importance of avoiding ‘needless protectionism.’”). 
 233. MODEL ARBITRATION ACT § I.12. 
 234. See infra text accompanying note 257. 
 235. See Better Business Bureaus Urge Fairness When Arbitration Is Used in Consumer 
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consumer of the consequences of agreeing to arbitration” and the 
customer’s formal and completely voluntary “acceptance of the 
arbitration clause.”236 
The BBB Rules of Binding Arbitration (Pre-Dispute) include many 
of the same features included in AAA consumer arbitration rules.237  
They are presented in a plain English format with prefatory questions 
and answers.238  It should be noted, however, that BBB’s primary 
emphasis is not on binding arbitration under pre-dispute agreements, but 
focuses on programs like the Autoline program for resolving disputes 
under motor vehicle “lemon laws”—programs that afford consumers an 
abbreviated, informal arbitration system that results in an award that 
consumers may accept the award, or decline the award and proceed to 
trial.239 
                                                                                                                       
Contracts, BBB (Mar. 26, 1998), http://www.bbb.org/us/article/better-business-bureaus-urge-
fairness-when-arbitration-is-used-in-consumer-contracts-179 [hereinafter Better Business Bureaus 
Urge Fairness].  The Council represents numerous local Better Business Bureaus throughout the 
United States and Canada.  Local bureaus often assist in the resolution of disputes between a local 
business and its customers.  See Louis Del Duca, Colin Rule & Zbynek Loebl, Facilitating 
Expansion of Cross-Border E-Commerce—Developing a Global Online Dispute Resolution System 
(Lessons Derived From Existing ODR Systems—Work of The United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law) 11–13 (Legal Studies Research Paper No. 25-2011, 2011). 
 236. Better Business Bureaus Urge Fairness, supra note 235.  The policy requires the contract 
mandating BBB arbitration to: 
 Identify the types of disputes that are covered by the arbitration clause; 
 Identify the arbitration forum and provide a telephone number to contact for 
additional information about the forum; 
 Disclose the nature and amount of any fees consumers may have to pay in connection 
with the filing or administration of their case; Advise consumers that, by signing the 
arbitration clause, they will not be able to go to court for that dispute; 
 Advise consumers if strict application of law, rather than principles of fairness or 
equity, will be the basis for an arbitrator’s decision; and, 
 Require that the consumer separately sign the arbitration clause that must include both 
a signature line for the consumer to acknowledge that he or she agrees to the 
arbitration process and waives the right to sue in court over the dispute and a 
statement advising the consumer that he or she does not have to sign the arbitration 
clause, and that the consumer will not be committed by the clause unless he or she 
affirmatively acknowledges acceptance of the arbitration process. 
Id. 
 237. BETTER BUS. BUREAU, RULES OF ARBITRATION [BINDING]: PRE-DISPUTE (2010), available 
at http://www.bbb.org/us/storage/16/documents/dispute-resolution/Arbitration%20Pre%20Dispute% 
20395781.pdf. 
 238. Id. at 1–3. 
 239. Interview with Rodney Davis, Vice President, Programs and Services, Better Business 
Bureau (Jan. 24, 2012) (notes on file with author). 
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D. Securities Arbitration Procedures and Program 
A relatively mature and robust system of arbitration for the 
resolution of investor–broker disputes that is in some respects a model 
for consumer dispute resolution has developed in a regulated 
environment.  Ever since the Supreme Court decision in 
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon enforced arbitration of investor 
claims under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,240 investors 
have been required to arbitrate their disputes with brokerage firms.  
McMahon was founded on the expectation that the SEC would employ 
“expansive power to ensure the adequacy of the arbitration procedures 
employed by [securities self-regulatory organizations and] to oversee and 
to regulate the rules.”241  Because it tends to be less costly and involve 
fewer procedural hurdles than going to court, securities arbitration has 
made it more feasible for investors to pursue and obtain recovery in 
many cases.242 
With the SEC’s oversight and approval, quasi-governmental but 
essentially private administrative bodies were established within self-
                                                          
 240. 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987) (holding that claims under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt 
Organizations Act and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 are subject to arbitration). 
 241. Id. at 233–34. 
 242. One leading Los Angeles investor advocate explains: 
Given the tremendous time and expense of pursuing any civil case in today’s reduced 
staff, overworked and lengthy delay court system, I believe that almost every case that 
seeks actual damages of less than $1,000,000 can be more efficiently pursued in 
arbitration using a fair forum.  By the time one pursues a claim for less than a $1,000,000 
against, for instance, a large[,] well[-]financed public corporation, by successfully 
defending motions to dismiss based on the pleadings and thereafter engaging in discovery 
involving depositions, contention interrogatories, requests for admissions and 
successfully defending summary motions and fending off any appeals, the average civil 
plaintiff may well have his or her $1,000,000 recovery significantly reduced by the 
expense of the court process.  Arbitration of a claim for less than $1,000,000 in a fair 
forum takes substantially less time and hence less expense because it involves 
significantly less discovery (most forums do not permit extensive pleading and motion 
practice and/or contention interrogatories and/or requests for admissions and/or summary 
motions).  Finally, petitions to vacate an award, the only avenue of appealing an adverse 
arbitration award, are much more limited than typical appeals of a court issued judgment.  
In deciding petitions to vacate an arbitration award, appellate courts cannot review the 
facts de novo.  Moreover, their review is limited to whether or not arbitrators manifestly 
disregard the law, acted outside the scope of their authority, engaged in fraud, failed to 
disclose a conflict of interest or unreasonably refused to grant a party an extension to 
continue the hearing.  Consequently, petitions to vacate an arbitration award are rarely 
granted. 
Email from Robert Uhl, investor attorney, Aidikoff, Uhl & Bakhtiari, to author (Jan. 25, 2012) (on 
file with author). 
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regulatory organizations—such as the New York Stock Exchange and 
the National Association of Securities Dealers—to administer 
arbitrations.243  Today, virtually all investor–broker arbitration in the 
United States is conducted under FINRA’s Dispute Resolution arm.244  
The SEC, its advisory body, the Securities Industry Conference on 
Arbitration (SICA),245 and FINRA’s own National Arbitration and 
Mediation Committee246 have actively promoted ongoing debate and 
discussion among investor–advocates and industry representatives, 
encouraging the continuing evolution of procedures that address public, 
as well as private, concerns.247 
The continuing oversight and dialogue has proven critical in the 
development of a continuing series of pro-consumer modifications in 
securities arbitration procedures.248  For example, although there was a 
                                                          
 243. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233–34 (stating that the Commission has broad authority to 
oversee arbitration procedures adopted by SROs and that the Commission has specifically approved 
the arbitration procedures of the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers). 
 244. Jill I. Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30 PACE L. REV. 1174, 1177 & 
n.22 (2010) (citing What is Dispute Resolution?, FINRA, http://www.publicjustice.net/Repository/ 
Files/What%20is%20Dispute%20Resolution.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2012)).  In 2007, NYSE and 
NASD consolidated to form FINRA, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.  See id. at 1177 
n.22 (citing Press Release, FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (July 30, 2007), available at http://www.finra.org/ 
Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/P036329). 
 245. The author was a Public Member of SICA for six years and Chair of SICA for two years. 
 246. The National Arbitration and Mediation Committee is appointed by the Board of Directors 
of FINRA Dispute Resolution, has between ten and twenty-five members, and has the authority “to 
recommend rules, regulations, procedures and amendments relating to arbitration, mediation, and 
other dispute resolution matters to the Board.  The NAMC shall also establish and maintain rosters 
of neutrals composed of persons from within and outside of the securities industry.”  FINRA, CODE 
OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER DISPUTES § 12102(b) (2011) [hereinafter CUSTOMER 
CODE]. 
 247. See Alicia J. Surdyk, Note, On the Continued Vitality of Securities Arbitration: Why Reform 
Efforts Must Not Preclude Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1131, 1137, 
1149–50, 1152–53 (2009) (describing development of rule on reasoned awards as an exposition of 
the SRO-based regulatory process coupled with SEC oversight); see also Constantine N. Katsoris, 
Securities Arbitrators Do Not Grow on Trees, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 49, 54–58 (2008) 
(discussing the formation of SICA and development of the Uniform Code of Arbitration); 
Constantine N. Katsoris, Roadmap to Securities ADR, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 413, 420–24 
(2006); Stipanowich, supra note 227, at 910–12. 
 248. See SEC INVESTOR ADVISORY COMM. PANEL ON SEC. ARB., FINANCIAL INDUSTRY 
REGULATORY AUTHORITY STATEMENT ON KEY ISSUES 1 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
spotlight/invadvcomm/iacmeeting051710-finra.pdf [hereinafter FINRA STATEMENT] (describing 
FINRA’s continuing review of its program to ensure procedural fairness and transparency).  See 
generally NASD DISPUTE RESOLUTION, THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT—A 
REPORT CARD (2007), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/ 
documents/industry/p036466.pdf (reporting developments in forum independence, financing, and 
administration; disclosures to investors; arbitrator selection, quality, and training; discovery; 
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vociferous debate over whether securities investors should be able to 
obtain punitive damages in the wake of Mastrobuono v. Shearson 
Lehman Hutton, Inc.,249 arbitrators do render punitive damages awards at 
rates comparable to judges and juries.250 
Another example involves the makeup of arbitration tribunals.  For 
many years a securities arbitration panel typically consisted of three 
arbitrators, a public chairperson, a public non-chairperson, and a 
representative of the securities industry, typically a broker or manager.251  
Critics long complained that fairness in the process was compromised 
because a member of the securities industry had the authority to pass 
judgment on peers in the industry.252  Therefore, the FINRA rules were 
recently changed to give investors the right to have an arbitrated claim 
heard by three public arbitrators, although the investor still has the right 
to choose two public arbitrators and one industry arbitrator.253 
Although securities arbitration procedures vary to some extent with 
the size of the claim, they have become increasingly similar to court 
procedures to ensure fundamental due process for investors.  There is, for 
example, document discovery in securities arbitration, and FINRA 
requires parties to cooperate in the exchange of documents and 
information.254  FINRA also adopted a Discovery Guide that lists 
documents that parties are presumptively entitled to in different kinds of 
                                                                                                                       
mediation; simplified and standard case rules; punitive damages; and other matters). 
 249. 514 U.S. 52 (1995).  The Court held that a New York decision prohibiting punitive damages 
by arbitrators did not preclude punitive damages in securities arbitrations subject to the FAA.  Id. at 
59, 64. 
 250. See FINRA STATEMENT, supra note 248, at 2 (“[A]rbitrators can and do award punitive 
damages in favor of investors.”); Stephen J. Choi & Theodore Eisenberg, Punitive Damages in 
Securities Arbitration: An Empirical Study, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 497, 541 (2010) (“The substantial 
rate of punitive awards by securities arbitrators does not support the most extreme views of 
arbitrators as systematically hostile to investors. Nor are arbitrators randomly granting punitive 
damages.”). 
 251. See Gross, supra note 244, at 1180 n.36 (citing CUSTOMER CODE, supra note 246, R. 
12402(b)). 
 252. See id. at 1185. 
 253. See FINRA STATEMENT, supra note 248, at 8–9, 19; CUSTOMER CODE, supra note 246, R. 
12403(a).  In a typical case, a party receives a list of thirty arbitrators divided into three groups; each 
party may strike up to four of the ten in each group and rank the remaining arbitrators.  CUSTOMER 
CODE, supra note 246, R. 12403(c).  In connection with this rank and strike procedure, FINRA 
provides each party with an arbitrator disclosure report that briefly summarizes the arbitrators’ 
educational and work background, any accounts each have with any broker dealer, and a listing of 
every securities arbitration in which the arbitrator has participated.  Id. RR. 12403(c), 12405.  The 
arbitrators listed in the arbitration disclosure report are available for review by the parties.  Id. R. 
12405(c). 
 254. See CUSTOMER CODE, supra note 246, R. 12505 (“The parties must cooperate to the fullest 
extent practicable in the exchange of documents and information to expedite the arbitration.”). 
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cases.255  On the other hand, there are usually no pre-hearing depositions, 
pre-hearing substantive motions, contention interrogatories, or requests 
for admissions.256 
Significantly, the FINRA rules make it clear that at the time disputes 
arise, investors retain the option of pursuing their claim individually 
through arbitration or pursuing a remedy through a class action, if that 
alternative is available in court.257  At a time when many companies are 
seeking to enforce class action waivers in connection with arbitration 
clauses,258 FINRA’s commitment to retaining the right to collective 
action sets its program apart as a hallmark of fairness. 
FINRA has tried to make its operations more transparent and to 
promote greater public understanding of and access to arbitration.259  
FINRA regulates the content and form of pre-dispute arbitration 
provisions in investor agreements, requiring highlighted language 
explaining to investors the implications of the arbitration agreement and 
“prohibiting agreements that would limit the ability of any investor to 
file any claim in arbitration or that limits the power of arbitrators to make 
any award,” including awards of punitive damages.260  It regulates fees to 
ensure that the securities industry bears the majority of administrative 
fees and waives hearing fees for investors who demonstrate financial 
hardship.261  FINRA assists investors in serving claims on brokerage 
firms.262  It conducts hearings at any of seventy-two cities nearest the 
investor’s residence.263  It provides expedited arbitration for senior or 
seriously ill parties.264 
FINRA’s website contains a variety of arbitration and mediation 
resources for investors, including roadmaps for filing a claim, 
understanding arbitration, and finding an attorney.265  FINRA provides 
                                                          
 255. See id. R. 12506. 
 256. See, e.g., id. R. 12507(a)(1) (“Standard interrogatories are generally not permitted in 
arbitration.”); id. R. 12510 (“Depositions are strongly discouraged in arbitration.”). 
 257. See id. R. 12204. 
 258. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 371. 
 259. See FINRA STATEMENT, supra note 248, at 1–2. 
 260. See id. at 2; see also Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change Adopting FINRA Rules, 76 
Fed. Reg. 5850 (Feb. 2, 2011) (approving FINRA Rule 2268). 
 261. See FINRA STATEMENT, supra note 248, at 3; CUSTOMER CODE, supra note 246, RR. 
12900–12903. 
 262. See FINRA STATEMENT, supra note 248, at 3; CUSTOMER CODE, supra note 246, R. 12302. 
 263. See FINRA STATEMENT, supra note 248, at 3; CUSTOMER CODE, supra note 246, R. 12213. 
 264. See FINRA STATEMENT, supra note 248, at 5; CUSTOMER CODE, supra note 246, R. 12207. 
 265. See Arbitration & Mediation, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/ 
index.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
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monthly online updates of its arbitration and mediation case statistics.266  
Through its Investor Education Foundation, FINRA funded a Guide to 
Securities Industry Disputes.267  “FINRA [also] supports several law 
school clinics that represent small investors who cannot afford to hire an 
attorney . . . .”268 
The SEC oversees the practices and policies of the FINRA 
arbitration program, conducting audits and passing along changes to 
arbitration procedures; the General Accounting Office also conducts 
occasional reviews.269  There is also a well-established body of 
experienced lawyers who regularly represent investors in arbitration.270 
E. Principles for ADR Provider Organizations 
Experience with the implementation of the Due Process Protocols 
and the evolution of securities arbitration under the auspices of FINRA 
and the SEC have highlighted the critical role of organizations that 
provide arbitration and dispute resolution services.271  Increasing 
attention has been given to the role providers play in establishing a fair 
and open playing field for dispute resolution. 
In 2002, a national ethics commission co-sponsored by the CPR 
Institute for Dispute Resolution272 and Georgetown University produced 
a wide-ranging set of Principles for ADR Provider Organizations.273  
The Provider Principles set out a series of guidelines for entities 
providing dispute resolution services under the following rubrics: (1) 
“[q]uality and [c]ompetence of [s]ervices;” (2) “[i]nformation 
[r]egarding [s]ervices and [o]perations;” (3) “[f]airness and 
                                                          
 266. See FINRA STATEMENT, supra note 248, at 1; Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Stati
stics/index.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
 267. See INVESTOR’S GUIDE TO SECURITIES INDUSTRY DISPUTES: HOW TO PREVENT AND 
RESOLVE DISPUTES WITH YOUR BROKER (Jill Gross, Edward Pekarek & Alice Oshins eds., 2011), 
available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/foundation/@foundation/documents/foundation/ 
p119054.pdf. 
 268. See FINRA STATEMENT, supra note 248, at 7; Find an Attorney or Other Legal 
Representation, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/ 
OptionsforInvestors/FindanAttorney/index.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2012) (listing nineteen law 
schools with investor clinics, including Pepperdine). 
 269. See FINRA STATEMENT, supra note 248, at 9. 
 270. See id. at 8. 
 271. See generally Stipanowich, supra note 100. 
 272. The Institute is now named the International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution. 
 273. PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 43.  The author was a member of 
the Commission and the Committee that developed the Principles. 
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[i]mpartiality;” (4) “[a]ccessibility of [s]ervices;” (5) “[d]isclosure of 
[o]rganizational [c]onflicts of [i]nterest;” (6) “[c]omplaint and 
[g]rievance [m]echanisms;” (7) “[e]thical [g]uidelines: for neutrals and 
the organization; (8) “[f]alse or [m]isleading [c]ommunications;” and (9) 
protection of “[c]onfidentiality.”274  The Principles were a 
groundbreaking contribution to public discussions about the roles and 
responsibilities of provider organizations though not explicitly adopted 
by provider organizations.  Subsequently, the AAA published its own 
Statement of Ethical Principles and internal ethics policy for its staff.275 
F. FTC Study on Debt Collection Adjudication 
In 2010, the FTC released an important report, entitled Repairing a 
Broken System: Protecting Consumers in Debt Collection Litigation and 
Arbitration.276  The report signals a singular effort to engender broad-
based discussion about the concerns of consumer-debtors in public and 
private debt collection adjudication, and it is highly, but constructively, 
critical of both litigation and arbitration.  Shedding useful light on the 
realm of debt collection arbitration, the report reinforces many frequently 
voiced concerns about consumer arbitration, including the lack of 
effective choice by consumers regarding binding arbitration,277 concerns 
about bias and appearance of bias on the part of arbitrators and 
arbitration forums,278 arbitration-related costs and the handling of 
costs,279 the opacity and difficulty of challenging arbitration awards280 
and the lack of information regarding the performance of arbitration 
systems.281  The report also points out some of the special concerns of 
consumers as defendants, including notice of the commencement of 
arbitration and the rendition of awards.282  In many cases, the FTC offers 
useful observations or recommendations for addressing fairness 
concerns. 
                                                          
 274. See generally id. Principles 1–9. 
 275. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, STATEMENT OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, available at http://www.adr.org (search for “Statement of Ethical 
Principles”). 
 276. FTC STUDY, supra note 20. 
 277. See id. at 42–46. 
 278. See id. at 46–53. 
 279. See id. at 60–62. 
 280. See id. at 62–67. 
 281. See id. at 67–70. 
 282. See id. at 55–59. 
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G. Online Dispute Resolution 
The explosion in online communication and the burgeoning of e-
commerce portends vast changes in our conceptions of human 
interaction, including the way we perceive, approach, and resolve 
conflict.283  Online dispute resolution (ODR) holds the promise of “a fast, 
efficient, flexible and inexpensive mechanism for handling e-commerce 
disputes, both at the domestic level and across borders”284—seemingly 
tailor-made for low-value, high-volume consumer disputes.  In addition 
to reduce cycle time and costs in dispute resolution, ODR may also 
facilitate communication through a standardized communication system, 
which incorporates automatic translation tools.285  Systemic transparency 
and integrity may be enhanced by the use of “[m]inimum [c]ommon 
ODR [r]ules” and standards for ODR provider organizations and 
neutrals, centralized clearinghouses hosting electronic communications, 
and maintaining a central case database286 that might be useful in tracking 
program performance and providing key data to users.  The Internet also 
makes possible innovative alternatives to traditional adjudication, such as 
eBay’s “Community Court” system, which puts a buyer/seller dispute in 
front of a randomly selected panel of “jurors”—other experienced and 
well-regarded eBay users.287  Although the legal and practical challenges 
are immense,288 it must be assumed that online platforms will transform 
dispute resolution and, with it, our concepts of how to achieve fairness in 
adjudication. 
H. Empirical Research 
Another source of guidance regarding concepts of fairness is the 
growing body of research cataloging the experiences and perceptions of 
consumers and employees.  The gathering of such empirical research has 
taken many forms and addressed a variety of important questions.  For 
                                                          
 283. See Del Duca, Rule & Loebl, supra note 235, at 2. 
 284. Id. at 5. 
 285. See Zbynek Loebl, Creating a Multilingual Communication Standard for Cross-Border 
ODR, ODR & CONSUMERS 2010 (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.odrandconsumers2010.org/2010/10/05/ 
creating-a-multilingual-communication-standard-for-cross-border-odr/. 
 286. See Del Duca, Rule & Loebl, supra note 235, at 16–18. 
 287. See Colin Rule & Chittu Nagarajan, Leveraging the Wisdom of Crowds: The eBay 
Community Court and the Future of Online Dispute Resolution, ACRESOLUTION, Winter 2010, at 5–
6, http://www.pmlink360.com/docs/acr.pdf. 
 288. See id. at 4–5 (discussing previous problems with online dispute resolution providers). 
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example, the California Ethics Standards require providers to provide 
case statistics, which gather a variety of information on consumer and 
employment disputes, including amounts claimed and amounts 
awarded.289  Academics are conducting empirical research in the field of 
dispute resolution and have uncovered some perceptions people have of 
arbitration.  Amy Schmitz, for example, has conducted studies that reveal 
that very few consumers are even aware that they have assented to the 
arbitration process simply by signing a contract.290  An empirical study 
conducted by Christopher Drahozal and Samantha Zyontz examined 
AAA-administered consumer cases;291 it determined that the AAA’s 
review of arbitration clauses for Consumer Due Process Protocol 
compliance was effective, resulting in the refusal to administer a 
substantial number of cases and forcing the hand of some 150 businesses 
to waive or revise problematic clauses.292  Other studies focus on arbitral 
awards and remedies.  Stephen Choi and Theodore Eisenberg, for 
example, have analyzed data on punitive damages awards in securities 
arbitration and compared these data to awards received in court,293 while 
Drahozal and Zyontz have compared dispositions of creditor claims in 
arbitration and in court.294  Jill Gross and Barbara Black have done 
empirical research on investor perceptions of securities arbitration.295  
They found that investors had a much more negative perception of the 
arbitration process than other survey participants and investors often 
perceived arbitrators were biased; Gross and Black recommended that 
FINRA allow investors to choose an all-public panel,296 which FINRA 
subsequently did.297 
Studies such as those outlined above will be helpful in assessing and 
defining what constitutes fairness within the arbitration framework.  
Conducting empirical research gives greater weight, accuracy, and 
neutrality to the conclusions we might make on what constitutes  
 
                                                          
 289. See CAL. ETHICS STANDARDS, supra note 157, Standard 7(d). 
 290. See Schmitz, supra note 4, at 156–60 (describing the results of Professor Schmitz’s study). 
 291. See Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 225. 
 292. Id. at 44–45. 
 293. Choi & Eisenberg, supra note 250, at 541. 
 294. See Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 228. 
 295. See Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of 
Investors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 349. 
 296. See id. at 400. 
 297. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
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fairness,298 and how to best cultivate it, by developing and implementing 
a rating system. 
I. Lessons of Experience 
The recent history of consumer and employment dispute 
resolution—including the development and application of pertinent 
standards of fairness in binding arbitration programs and related 
empirical findings—provides a useful foundation for constructing a 
rating system for such disputes.  First, fairness considerations must begin 
with circumstances of contracting—the voluntariness of an individual’s 
decision to arbitrate,299 his awareness of the implications of arbitrating 
instead of going to court, and access to information about the arbitration 
program.300  Second, procedural rules containing substantive due process 
standards mean little or nothing if they are not actively enforced and 
stringently administered,301 preferably by an independent and impartial 
third party.302  Third, concepts of fairness must be applied in a way that 
reflects the nature of the conflict.  The needs of parties in high-value, 
low-volume disputes are likely to be very different from those in low-
value, high-volume disputes,303 and the process needs and concerns of 
individual defendants differ to some extent from those of individual 
plaintiffs.304  Fourth, whether consumers and employees can participate 
in class or collective actions may have significant implications in some 
transactional settings.  Some companies now include class action waivers 
in the context of arbitration agreements, while others do not—as 
illustrated by the general rule in securities arbitration giving investors the 
class action option.305  Fifth, many of our assumptions and expectations 
regarding the character and limitations of arbitration—and other dispute 
resolution approaches—are likely to be challenged or upset by the  
                                                          
 298. But see Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 421–34 (discussing shortcomings of currently existing 
empirical research and recommendations for future research and due process protections). 
 299. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 300. See infra Parts IV.B.2–3. 
 301. See infra Part IV.C. 
 302. See infra Part IV.D. 
 303. See Del Duca, Rule & Loebl, supra note 235, at 26–27. 
 304. See supra text accompanying note 282. 
 305. See infra Part IV.E.8. 
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development of sophisticated ODR platforms,306 which have the potential 
to address at least some of our concerns about fairness.307 
IV. ELEMENTS OF AN ARBITRATION FAIRNESS INDEX FOR CONSUMER 
AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 
A. Some General Observations—and Cautions 
A possible template for the Arbitration Fairness Index is depicted in 
Table A.308  The template is designed for an individual company’s 
consumer arbitration program or employment arbitration program.  Rated 
programs are assessed on each of twenty-three different program 
elements divided into five categories: (1) Meaningful Consent, Clarity, 
and Transparency; (2) Independent and Balanced Administration; (3) 
Quality and Suitability of Arbitrators; (4) Fair Hearings; and (5) Fair 
Outcomes.309  No attempt has been made to assign relative weights or 
point values to each element for reasons discussed below. 
                                                          
 306. See supra Part III.G. 
 307. Another lesson from experience is that binding arbitration and other forms of binding 
adjudication are ill-suited to serve as first-tier remedial approaches.  There should always be early 
opportunities for negotiation, mediation, or other appropriate forms of non-binding, third-party 
facilitation.  See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS 
USERS 5 (Thomas J. Stipanowich & Peter H. Kaskell eds., 2001) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION].  These concerns, however, are only tangentially related to the topic of this paper. 
 308. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 309. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
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Table A.  Arbitration Fairness Index© 
(for Binding Arbitration Programs under Pre-dispute Arbitration Agreements in 
Consumer and Employment Contracts) 






Meaningful consent to 
arbitrate  
(RELATIVE WEIGHTS OF RESPECTIVE 




Adequate notice and 
disclosure 
Clear guidance for 
program users 
(“roadmap”) and access 
to helpline 







impartial administration  





Balanced input in roster 
of arbitrators 
Diversity 
Experience and training 
Disclosure and challenge 
mechanism  
Ethics standards and 
complaint mechanism 





Access to information 
and discovery 
Limitations period  
Expeditious process 
Fair hearing 





Access to remedies 
available in court 
Publication of reasoned 
awards 
Outcomes 
© 2012 Thomas J. Stipanowich.  All rights reserved. 
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1. Rated Programs 
There are several reasons why it makes sense to rate individual 
companies’ arbitration programs—that is, an employer organization or a 
company selling consumer goods or services—as opposed to simply 
evaluating the rules and procedures of organizations that provide 
arbitration services—“arbitration forums” or “provider organizations.”  
First, some companies do not use the services of outside providers for 
their arbitration program, but administer their programs in-house or 
through a proprietary arm.310  More importantly, companies that do 
incorporate the rules of outside arbitration forums or provider 
organizations in their contracts may introduce—or attempt to 
introduce—customized modifications to the rules and procedures of the 
outside providers.311  These may, for example, impose special limitations 
on arbitral remedies and courses of action, such as class action 
waivers.312  Additionally, individual companies are in a position to exert 
considerable control over the amount and quality of information 
provided to consumers or employees about their arbitration programs.  
There may be situations in which these factors tend to discourage 
individuals from pressing claims at all, and thus, an outside provider will 
never receive demands for arbitration against the company.  Only by 
examining individual arbitration programs in their totality—including the 
impact of specific contractual provisions and other surrounding 
circumstances—can we appreciate and evaluate fairness. 
Of course, provider institutions are a critical element of most 
consumer and employment arbitration programs, and their active 
compliance will be critical in implementing the Index. Moreover, there is 
no reason why arbitration forums or provider organizations may not also 
be subject to a separate “arbitration forum/provider” rating system, and 
there are good reasons why they should be.  Arbitration forums—many 
                                                          
 310. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1999) (describing 
employer-developed arbitration rules and procedures); Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 
P.2d 903, 909 (Cal. 1997) (same); see also Edward A. Dauer, Engalla’s Legacy to Arbitration: Why 
Independent Administration Is Important, in AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK ON 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 100, at 149, 157–58 (noting that in the wake of Engalla, 
self-administration can make a finding of fraud more likely, and would undoubtedly receive a higher 
level of scrutiny from courts; thus, organizations wishing to avoid that eventuality should adopt an 
independently administered arbitration program). 
 311. See Schmitz, supra note 4, at 146, 148 (naming companies that include class waiver 
provisions and other provisions complying with the Consumer Due Process Protocol in their 
contracts). 
 312. See id. at 148, 152–53. 
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of which exist to make a profit from the services they offer—are 
generally unregulated.313  As discussed below, they play a primary role in 
setting the table for consumer and employment arbitration through the 
development of rules and procedures,314 the maintenance of rosters of 
arbitrators,315 the administration of individual cases,316 the selection and 
handling of challenges to arbitrators,317 the establishment and 
implementation of fee structures,318 and the maintenance of case 
statistics.319  Furthermore, the number of recognized independent 
arbitration forums is rather small, and it may be that by assembling 
information about and evaluating these key provider organizations we 
obviate the need to examine their rules, procedures, and administration 
every time a company incorporates their rules in a contract. 
The present template is intended to evaluate only binding arbitration 
programs and not other forms of dispute resolution.  It is expected that 
participation in the great majority of these programs will be triggered by 
pre-dispute arbitration provisions in consumer or individual employment 
contracts.  Although a comprehensive dispute resolution program for 
consumers or employees often—and appropriately—includes hotlines or 
complaint services, as well as provisions for facilitated negotiation, 
mediation, and the like,320 the present template focuses on binding 
arbitration. 
2. Limitations of a Template 
Importantly, no single template may be wholly suitable for the broad 
range of consumer and employment arbitration programs.  Because, as 
the Berlin Principles state, rankings must “be designed with due regard to 
their purpose,”321 several variations of the Index may be necessary.  Even 
if the elements of the rating system remain the same, the assessment 
process is likely to be very different for an arbitration program aimed at 
                                                          
 313. The FINRA securities arbitration program is an exception.  See supra notes 240–57 and 
accompanying text. 
 314. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 315. See infra Part IV.D.1. 
 316. See infra Part IV.C. 
 317. See infra Part IV.D.5. 
 318. See infra Part IV.E.1. 
 319. See infra Part IV.F.1–2. 
 320. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, ‘Real Time’ Strategies for Relational Conflict, 3 IBA 
MEDIATION COMM. NEWSL. 6, 7 (2007) (discussing conflict management systems in the workplace). 
 321. RANKING SYSTEMS, supra note 107, at 52. 
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relatively high-value employment disputes, as compared to a program 
designed for a high volume of low-value consumer disputes. 
The identification of appropriate rating “elements” or “indicators” is 
another challenge, since some elements may be relevant and valid in one 
kind of consumer or employment arbitration scenario but not in others.  
Even with twenty-three separate program elements, our rating system 
does not include an element addressing the situation where a company 
offers specific incentives to induce agreements to arbitrate.  It also does 
not reference “notice of filing of an arbitration demand” and “notice of 
award”—two elements that relate chiefly to process concerns like debt 
collection where consumers are defending claims and may be prejudiced 
by inadequate notice.322  Finally, it does not address the role of 
confidentiality, which may be an advantage or disadvantage to 
individuals in arbitration, depending on the circumstances.323 
3. Weighting 
The relative weight to be assigned to various elements of the 
Arbitration Fairness Index is likely to engender discussion and debate.  
The present template does not attempt to assign weights to various 
elements, leaving such questions to the deliberation and collective 
judgment of a broad-based advisory group, which hopefully will be 
charged with assisting in the development and implementation of the 
Arbitration Fairness Index.324 
Another charge for an advisory group will be to award point values 
or ratings (e.g., “terrible,” “very good,” etc.) to a program depending on 
the way it addresses each of the respective fairness elements.  This again, 
is a challenging prospect, but the task should be made easier by various 
guideposts, some of which are referenced in the following explanatory 
discussion.  In any event, the effort to reach agreement on assigning  
                                                          
 322. See FTC STUDY, supra note 20, at 55–59, 64–67 (discussing concerns about notice to 
debtors of pending arbitration and concerns about notice of the rendition of an arbitration award on a 
pending debt). 
 323. The Consumer Due Process Protocol calls for arbitrators to “make reasonable efforts to 
maintain the privacy of the hearing to the extent permitted by applicable law” and to “consider 
claims of privilege and confidentiality when addressing evidentiary issues.”  CONSUMER PROTOCOL, 
supra note 33, Principle 12(2).  But see David v. O’Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1078–79 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (holding a confidentiality clause of an arbitration agreement unconscionable because it 
limited the ability of claimant to pursue claims and interview witnesses). 
 324. See infra Part V.B.2 (describing implementation of Index and need for broad-based 
advisory group). 
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point values for a rating system should be immeasurably easier than 
getting Congress to agree on pertinent legislation! 
In the following discussion regarding the Arbitration Fairness Index, 
many references will be made to “consumers” instead of the more 
cumbersome “consumers or employees,” but it should be understood that 
the designation is intended to refer to either or both groups as the case 
may be. 
B. Meaningful Consent, Clarity, and Transparency 
1. Meaningful Consent to Arbitrate 
At the heart of the debate over pre-dispute binding arbitration 
agreements is the issue of informed consent.  For this reason, 
“meaningful consent to arbitrate” is the first element in the Arbitration 
Fairness Index.  A 2010 FTC report on debt collection arbitration 
concluded that “consumers . . . can make meaningful choices [about 
arbitration] only if they are aware of the arbitration provisions in 
contracts and have the ability to make choices regarding those 
provisions.”325 
Professor Schmitz’s recent study supports the conclusion that many 
companies do not employ “robust assent mechanisms” with respect to 
arbitration provisions in consumer contracts, but they essentially rely on 
the fact that consumers will not be able to shop around for optimal 
terms.326  Her research also suggests that consumers are usually unaware 
of arbitration terms in contracts327 and often have the feeling that it is a 
waste of time to read form contract provisions “because they have no 
choice but to accept them.”328  Moreover, they tend to “have little or no 
understanding of arbitration,” reinforcing general suspicions about the 
effectiveness of arbitration as a substitute for court.329  These concerns 
are reinforced by the 2010 FTC report.330  When consumers are brought 
                                                          
 325. FTC STUDY, supra note 20, at 42. 
 326. Schmitz, supra note 4, at 149–50. 
 327. See id. at 167. 
 328. See id. at 152–54, 158–60 (discussing consumers’ skepticism toward arbitration, 
consumers’ trouble contacting company representatives or trying to negotiate specific terms, and 
consumers’ relative passivity with respect to trying to negotiate arbitration terms). 
 329. Id. at 152. 
 330. See FTC STUDY, supra note 20, at 42–45; see also Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. 
Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average 
Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 73 (2004) (“[T]his study provides little 
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into an arbitration program under these circumstances, their perceptions 
of the legitimacy of the process and its outcomes are likely to be 
negatively affected.331 
In order to achieve the maximum rating for “meaningful consent to 
arbitrate,” a company would need to demonstrate that consumers were 
offered a clear choice whether to arbitrate or seek litigation.  The choice 
needs to be affirmatively raised during the course of bargaining and 
made the subject of a discrete election; a less satisfactory (but in cases 
involving packaged consumer products, necessary) fallback would be a 
provision giving consumers an opportunity to “opt out” of arbitration 
after reading the terms of the contract.332 
2. Adequate Notice and Disclosure 
Again, meaningful assent requires an understanding of exactly what 
is given and received in choosing arbitration.  Professor Schmitz’s 
research indicates the difficulty consumer credit card or wireless 
customers have in getting details about arbitration provisions in their 
contracts.333  The specific terms may not be available for inspection until 
after the contracting process.334  They tend to be buried in lengthy 
boilerplate, often in small-font typeface; they might be included in 
monthly “bill stuffers” or electronic formats accessible only through 
links that consumers might overlook.335  Arbitration clauses vary widely 
in “length, specificity and content.”336  At least some terms are 
confusing, and some except companies from limitations or requirements 
imposed on consumers.337  These realities emphasize the need for more 
effective notice and education regarding arbitration provisions.338  
                                                                                                                       
basis for believing that consumers are making informed decisions when they ‘agree’ to arbitrate in 
predispute arbitration clauses.”). 
 331. See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 147, at 817–20. 
 332. See FTC STUDY, supra note 20, at 43–44 (discussing issues with “opt-out” approaches). 
 333. See Schmitz, supra note 4, at 144–50. 
 334. Id. at 145. 
 335. Id. at 149.  Schmitz’s discussions with consumers indicate, not surprisingly, that consumers 
“regularly throw out ‘bill stuffers’” and tend to bypass posted contractual terms in e-contracts.  Id. at 
152. 
 336. Id. at 146. 
 337. See id. at 148–49 (noting that consumers, but not companies, may be subject to time 
limitations on claims under some provisions). 
 338. The Consumer Due Process Protocol provides that at the time of contracting, the consumer 
should be given “clear and adequate” notice and “reasonable means” to obtain information about the 
ADR program.  CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 2 (emphasis omitted).  According 
 
STIPANOWICH FINAL.DOC 8/2/2012  11:31 AM 
2012] THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS INDEX 1037 
Consumers tend to want more information about arbitration and require 
fundamental guidance about what the arbitration alternative entails.339 
Meaningful notice and disclosure should include prominent, easy-to-
understand statements about what arbitration alternatives entail340 and 
how arbitration differs from going to court.341  These should be presented 
in such a way as to ensure that consumers have an opportunity to read 
them before specifically accepting or declining arbitration.  This 
information should be coupled with clear directions to obtain additional 
information if desired. 
                                                                                                                       
to the Reporter’s Comments, consumers should be provided with, at minimum, “written information 
to explain the process.”  Id.  Principle 2, Reporter’s Comments.  Such information should include: 
(1) the “nature and purpose of the process”; (2) “an indication of whether or not the [c]onsumer has a 
choice regarding use of the process”; (3) “the role of parties and attorneys”; (4) “procedures for 
selection of [n]eutrals”; (5) “rules of conduct for [n]eutrals, and complaint procedures”; (6) “fees and 
expenses”; (7) “information regarding ADR program operation”; (8) “availability of special 
services”; and (9) “availability of alternatives to ADR, including small claims court.”  Id.  Where 
binding arbitration is concerned, consumers should also be given a straightforward explanation of 
the differences between arbitration and litigation.  Id. Principle 11; see also JAMS POLICY ON 
CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS, supra note 220 (“The consumer must be given notice of the arbitration 
clause.”). 
 339. See Schmitz, supra note 4, at 159–60. 
 340. See id. at 168–69.  See, e.g., CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 2, Reporter’s 
Comments (“All materials should be prepared in plain straightforward language.  As a rule, such 
information should be in the same language as the principal contract for goods or services.”); id. 
Principle 11, Practical Suggestions (sample notice); see also FINRA STATEMENT, supra note 248, at 
2 (“Predispute arbitration clauses in investor agreements must be highlighted and preceded by 
specified language stating, among other matters, that parties to a predispute arbitration agreement are 
giving up the right to sue each other in court; and that arbitration awards are generally final and 
binding.  The contract also must contain a highlighted statement immediately preceding the signature 
line that states that the contract contains a predispute arbitration agreement, and the firm must give a 
copy of the agreement to the investor, who must acknowledge receiving it.”); JAMS POLICY ON 
CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS, supra note 220 (The “existence, terms, conditions and implications [of 
an arbitration clause] must be clear”). 
 341. One example is provided in the Consumer Due Process Protocol.  The language of a notice 
might read as follows: 
This agreement provides that all disputes between you and [PROVIDER] will be resolved 
by BINDING ARBITRATION.  You thus GIVE UP YOUR RIGHT TO GO TO COURT 
to assert or defend your rights under this contract (EXCEPT for matters that may be taken 
to SMALL CLAIMS COURT). . . . Your rights will be determined by a NEUTRAL 
ARBITRATOR and NOT a judge or jury. . . . You are entitled to a FAIR HEARING, 
BUT the arbitration procedures are SIMPLER AND MORE LIMITED THAN RULES 
APPLICABLE IN COURT. . . . Arbitrator decisions are as enforceable as any court order 
and are subject to VERY LIMITED REVIEW BY A COURT. 
CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 11, Practical Suggestions. 
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3. Clear Guidance for Program Users (“Roadmap”) and Access to 
Helpline 
Information about an arbitration program would preferably involve 
simple online access to the arbitration agreement as well as any 
incorporated terms and procedures.342  All of these documents should be 
written in plain English,343 and if appropriate under the circumstances, 
should be available in multiple languages.344  Some organizations offer 
user-friendly explanations of the arbitration process in different forms.345  
Ideally, there would also be access to a consumer website, helpline, or 
hotline to provide basic guidance about the arbitration program.346 
4. Ease of Court Oversight 
Delegation clauses—provisions authorizing arbitrators to address 
issues regarding the enforceability of the arbitration agreement—are 
ubiquitous in commercial contracts here and internationally.347  The 
Supreme Court, however, recently ruled that a broad delegation clause in 
an employment arbitration agreement is enforceable; this significantly 
limits the ability of consumers to get a court to consider defenses to an 
arbitration agreement prior to arbitration.348  Hence, resort to a court for 
redress is usually delayed until after an arbitration award is rendered and, 
at that stage, is subject to rather stringent limits on the grounds for 
judicial vacatur of award.349  These strictures are exacerbated by the fact 
that an arbitration award may contain no rationale in support of the 
announced result. 
With these realities in mind, “ease of court oversight” is included as 
an element of the Index.  The presence and breadth of clauses delegating 
                                                          
 342. See Schmitz, supra note 4, at 169. 
 343. See, e.g., CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 2, Reporter’s Comments (“All 
materials should be prepared in plain straightforward language.”). 
 344. See, e.g., DEBT COLLECTION PROTOCOL, supra note 190, Principle 4 (stating that efforts 
should be made to communicate in the primary language of the respondent). 
 345. For example, FINRA provides online assistance for claimants.  See, e.g., FINRA, UNIFORM 
FORMS GUIDE (2011), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/arbitrationmediation/@arbmed/ 
@tools/documents/arbmed/p007954.pdf. 
 346. See, e.g., id. at 6 (listing FINRA’s hotline number). 
 347. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 367, 370 (stating that delegation provisions will 
“be[come] ubiquitous in employment and consumer contracts”). 
 348. See id. at 364–70 (discussing Rent-A-Center and its implications). 
 349. See id. at 368 (stating that courts “accord arbitration discretion significant deference”). 
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authority to arbitrators that would eliminate the possibility of front-end 
judicial policing should reduce a program’s rating.  If arbitration rules do 
not require arbitrators to support their awards with basic rationales and 
clearly indicate the disposition of claims, including awards of attorney 
fees, interest, and punitive damages, then the rules should receive a lower 
rating in this category.350 
5. Published Program Statistics 
When it comes to arbitration, another dimension of understanding 
comes through familiarity with the system.  One would expect regular 
users to have more accurate expectations about the likelihood of success 
in arbitration and knowledge of, or experience with, particular 
arbitrators.351  Thanks to the California Ethics Standards, some major 
provider organizations have furnished various data on individual 
consumer and employment arbitrations under their operation,352 although 
the data are not summarized.  FINRA publishes monthly updates of case 
statistics on its website.353  Preferably, consumers should have access to 
data that provide summaries that reflect consumer win rates, as well as 
basic information regarding individual arbitrators such as the business 
parties and law firms that appeared before them and summaries of their 
prior awards.354 
C. Independent and Balanced Administration 
1. Independent and Impartial Administration 
Fairness in binding arbitration programs for consumers cannot be 
achieved solely through statutes, court decisions, regulators, or 
                                                          
 350. See Surdyk, supra note 247, at 1149–50, 1152–53 (describing development of rule on 
reasoned arbitration awards as an exposition of the current SRO-based regulatory process coupled 
with SEC oversight). 
 351. See Colvin, supra note 227, at 11–16 (providing a nuanced discussion of the repeat-player 
dynamic in employment arbitration); Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical 
Study of AAA Consumer Arbitrations, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 843, 857–62, 908–16 (2010) 
(discussing possible reasons for the repeat-player effect and implications of various studies, 
including the authors’ own analysis of AAA consumer data). 
 352. See, e.g., Consumer Arbitration Statistics, supra note 173; JAMS Disclosures, supra note 
173. 
 353. Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 266. 
 354. The California Ethics Standards seek data of this kind.  See supra notes 168–73 and 
accompanying text. 
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arbitrators.  There is always the need for a mechanism for the creation 
and administration of the arbitration program.  How can arbitration 
proceed without fair and appropriate procedures, tailored for specific 
transactional settings, and how are these developed?  Realistically, how 
does a consumer choose an arbitrator without an accessible, carefully 
developed roster of candidates?  Who creates the roster and sets the 
criteria for inclusion, and will there be a voice for consumers in the 
process?  Who screens potential arbitrators for possible conflicts of 
interest and addresses challenges to their appointment?  Who handles 
complaints about arbitrators’ performance?  Who handles the payment of 
their fees?  Who, if anyone, maintains records of the program, monitors 
and evaluates the operation of the program, and undertakes appropriate 
changes?  The answers to these questions are critical to the consumer’s 
experience in arbitration.  The character and commitment to fairness of 
the institution “behind” the arbitration process should be of paramount 
concern.355 
The pervasive role of such institutions is reflected in the 
Employment Due Process Protocol,356 which repeatedly makes 
references to a “designating agency” as a part of the implementation of a 
fair arbitration program.357  Although one might intuit as much, the 
                                                          
 355. Stipanowich, supra note 100, at 47. 
Some “provider organizations,” such as JAMS, exist to make a profit, while others (like 
AAA) claim public interest priorities; all compete in the burgeoning and increasingly 
saturated marketplace of private dispute resolution, usually with minimal regulatory 
oversight.  Some span continents, while others serve regional or local markets and needs.  
Some only compile and publish lists of arbitrators and mediators (“neutrals”), some train 
or purport to “certify”; others act as appointing authorities—helping parties to select 
arbitrators or mediators for particular cases; still others offer a broader spectrum of 
administrative support for parties in conflict. 
Id. 
 356. EMPLOYMENT PROTOCOL, supra note 187. 
 357. The Employment Protocol calls for arbitrators to 
[b]e bound by applicable agreements, statutes, regulations and rules of procedure of the 
designating agency, including the authority to determine the time and place of the 
hearing, permit reasonable discovery, issue subpoenas, decide arbitrability issues, 
preserve order and privacy in the hearings, rule on evidentiary matters, determine the 
close of the hearing and procedures for post-hearing submissions, and issue an award 
resolving the submitted dispute. 
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).  A separate section calls for training “administered perhaps by the 
designating agency, such as the AAA, at various locations throughout the country.”  Id. at 3 
(emphasis added).  Another provision states that “[u]pon request of the parties, the designating 
agency should utilize a list procedure such as that of the AAA or select a panel composed of an odd 
number of mediators and arbitrators from its roster or pool.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The Protocol 
also acknowledges the potential role of designating agencies in “negotiating the parties’ share of 
costs and collecting [arbitral fees so as to possibly] reduce the bias potential of disparate 
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Employment Protocol did not make clear whether the designating agency 
needed to be independent and impartial. 
The establishment of ADR programs within, or on behalf of, 
particular companies, tied to provisions in standardized employment or 
consumer contracts that require employees or customers to arbitrate, 
raised special concerns about the independence and impartiality of those 
rendering dispute resolution services and the fairness of dispute 
resolution in general.358  Such programs blossomed in the wake of a 
string of U.S. Supreme Court decisions broadly enforcing contractual 
arbitration agreements and requiring parties to arbitrate virtually the 
entire spectrum of civil claims, including statute-based actions.359 
Concerns are greatest in the context of a private adjudicative system 
set up and administered by companies.  Some time ago, the California 
Supreme Court denied enforcement to an arbitration agreement in the 
consumer contract of the nation’s largest HMO on the basis of false 
representations to the public about the speed of its internally-
administered claims arbitration process;360 the HMO subsequently junked 
its in-house program and established an “outside” process.361  In another 
highly publicized decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals struck 
down an employment arbitration program run by, and heavily skewed 
toward, an employer—Hooters.362 
Even with outside providers, the presence of an ongoing service 
relationship with a corporate entity raises red flags when other parties are 
not repeatedly engaged with the provider.  Providers should recognize 
that a close connection between a provider and company may be a source 
of concern to the incidental user—the employee or customer who is 
                                                                                                                       
contributions by forwarding payment to the mediator and/or arbitrator without disclosing the parties’ 
share therein.”  Id. at 5. 
 358. See JAY FOLBERG ET AL., RESOLVING DISPUTES: THEORY, PRACTICE AND LAW 691–731 
(2d ed. 2010).  See generally Stipanowich, supra note 199, at 888–916 (arguing for greater 
accountability in the ADR context). 
 359. See FOLBERG ET AL., supra note 358, at 695–708. 
 360. Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 922 (Cal. 1997). 
 361. See BLUE RIBBON ADVISORY PANEL ON KAISER PERMANENTE ARBITRATION, THE KAISER 
PERMANENTE ARBITRATION SYSTEM: A REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 3, 
31–45 (1998), available at http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/oia/Forms/BRP%20Report.pdf [hereinafter 
KAISER PERMANENTE ARBITRATION SYSTEM] (giving recommendations to establish the “outside” 
process in response to Engalla); see also Office of the Independent Administrator, OIA, 
http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) (“The OIA administers arbitrations 
between Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. and its California health plan members.  The OIA is a 
neutral, independent office.  We are not part of Kaiser.”). 
 362. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938–40 (4th Cir. 1999) (discussing the 
biased provisions and holding that promulgation of such rules breached the employment contract). 
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drawn into an ADR process by a pre-dispute ADR clause in a company-
drafted contract.  The highly visible action by the Minnesota attorney 
general against the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), alleging fraud 
and deceptive practices and resulting in a settlement under which NAF 
ceased administering consumer credit arbitration disputes,363 highlighted 
concerns about potential conflicts of interest stemming from 
relationships between private ADR provider institutions and those that 
regularly use their services.364  Similar concerns are reflected in Walker 
v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., in which a federal district court 
found that the arbitration provider was responsible for at least three 
instances of “structural bias.”365 
The broad-based national groups that developed due process 
protocols for consumer and health care disputes each separately 
concluded that contractually mandated, private conflict resolution should 
be independently administered.366  The Consumer Due Process Protocol 
states: 
If participation in . . . arbitration is mandatory, the procedure should be 
administered by an Independent ADR Institution.  Administrative 
services should include the maintenance of a panel of prospective 
Neutrals, facilitation of Neutral selection, collection and distribution of 
Neutral’s fees and expenses, oversight and implementation of ADR 
rules and procedures, and monitoring of Neutral qualifications, 
performance, and adherence to pertinent rules, procedures and ethical 
standards.367 
The role of the Independent ADR Institution is inextricably intertwined 
throughout the Consumer Due Process Protocol. 
In a similar vein, the California Ethics Standards call upon 
arbitration provider organizations as well as arbitrators to make 
disclosures relating to possible conflicts of interest.368  Concerns about 
independence and impartiality are also reflected in the 2002 CPR–
Georgetown Principles for ADR Provider Organizations.369 
                                                          
 363. See Consent Judgment, Minnesota v. Nat’l Arb. Forum, Inc., No. 27-cv-09-18550 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. July 17, 2009), available at http://pubcit.typepad.com/files/nafconsentdecree.pdf. 
 364. See Bales & Eviston, supra note 38, at 12–13 (discussing potential conflicts) 
 365. 289 F. Supp. 2d 916, 923–24 (M.D. Tenn. 2003), aff’d 400 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 366. See CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 3; HEALTHCARE PROTOCOL, supra 
note 189, Principle 4. 
 367. CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 3(2) (emphasis omitted). 
 368. See CAL. ETHICS STANDARDS, supra note 157, Standards 7–8. 
 369. See PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 43, Principles 3, 5, 7. 
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The independence and impartiality of the arbitration provider should 
be an element of any rating system for consumer arbitration programs.370 
2. Balanced Input in Rules and Policies 
The development of the Protocols and the evolution of securities 
arbitration procedures exemplify the importance of having rules and 
policies developed and refined by a balanced advisory group 
representing the interests of all stakeholders, with particular emphasis on 
the effective representation of consumers or employees.371  The group 
                                                                                                                       
A further word is in order about provider accountability.  Like the arbitrators who act under 
their imprimatur, providers are cloaked with quasi-judicial immunity to preserve the integrity of the 
arbitration process.  See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511–12 (1978) (extending quasi-judicial 
immunity to non-judicial officials is properly based on the “functional comparability” of the 
individual’s acts and judgments to the acts and judgments of judges (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 
U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976))); Corey v. NYSE, 691 F.2d 1205, 1209, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982) (same).  
The principle of arbitral immunity is well established in the courts, along with a penumbra of 
immunity for providers.  See, e.g., Corey, 691 F.2d at 1211 (extending immunity to providers); see 
also New Eng. Cleaning Servs., Inc. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 199 F.3d 542, 544–46 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(extending immunity to providers for liability arising from arbitrator selection, billing, scheduling, 
and other administrative acts); Honn v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 182 F.3d 1014, 1017 (8th 
Cir. 1999) (extending arbitral immunity to organizations that sponsor arbitrations); Hawkins v. Nat’l 
Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 149 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 1998) (extending arbitral immunity to 
NASD for contractual arbitration proceedings); Olson v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 85 F.3d 
381, 382–83 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that NASD is immune from liability for a tainted arbitration 
proceeding).  A decade ago, the revision of the Uniform Arbitration Act reignited debate over the 
scope of arbitral immunity, including institutional immunity.  The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act 
states: “An arbitrator or an arbitration organization acting in that capacity is immune from civil 
liability to the same extent as a judge of a court of this State acting in a judicial capacity.”  UNIF. 
ARBITRATION ACT § 14(a) (amended 2000).  Scholars continue to raise questions regarding the 
scope of arbitral immunity.  See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an 
Age of Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449 (2004) (examining per se 
immunity doctrines for arbitrators and arbitration providers and suggesting remedies for arbitral 
failures).  The existence of provider immunity raises the question of alternative ways to ensure 
accountability.  See id. at 460, 511–16. 
 370. Some companies allow consumers to choose among two or more providers.  See, e.g., 
Demaine & Hensler, supra note 330, at 67.  Given sufficient information to make effective choices, 
this affords consumers additional flexibility. 
 371. See Lisa B. Bingham et al., Evaluating Dispute System Design, in DISPUTE SYSTEM 
DESIGN: PREVENTING, MANAGING, AND RESOLVING CONFLICT (forthcoming 2012) (discussing level 
of self-determination or control of disputants in process, outcome, and dispute systems design).  The 
Consumer Due Process Protocol contains the following “Practical Suggestion” pertaining to the 
establishment of ADR policies and procedures: 
A helpful model for program administrators is the User Advisory Committee now being 
utilized by the AAA to establish procedures and policies for ADR in the areas of 
employment, construction, health care, and other transactional settings. Such entities 
should provide a forum in which representatives of Consumers and Providers [of goods 
and services] cooperate in the development and implementation of policies and 
procedures governing an ADR program, including selection of Neutrals. 
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should include individuals with pertinent advocacy and arbitration 
experience. 
Of course, the development of rules and policies is an ongoing 
process that requires a commitment to continuous stakeholder input.  
One previously discussed illustration of process evolution through robust 
discussion and debate involved the joint initiatives of FINRA’s 
(previously NASD’s) advisory committee and the Securities Industry 
Conference on Arbitration—two groups bringing together investor and 
brokerage industry advocates to develop guidelines or templates for 
discovery, including “presumptively discoverable” documents for 
different kinds of investor claims.372 
D. Quality and Suitability of Arbitrators 
1. Balanced Input in Roster of Arbitrators 
Of all the ways in which provider organizations may affect the user’s 
experience, none is as likely to be as critical as the organizations’ role in 
screening and facilitating the selection of neutrals.  Providers often assist 
in the arbitrator selection process by identifying prospective neutrals 
based on criteria provided by the parties and, in some cases, making the 
appointment.  Moreover, providers may be empowered to consider and 
rule upon challenges to an appointee. At the conclusion of the 
proceeding, some providers furnish a mechanism for evaluating the 
neutral and the process. 
Establishing and maintaining a roster or “pool” of neutrals is usually 
a core competency of providers—a need that is first and foremost in the 
minds of those seeking dispute resolution services.373  In each 
                                                                                                                       
CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 3, Practical Suggestions (citation omitted) (citing 
KAISER PERMANENTE ARBITRATION SYSTEM, supra note 361, at 32). 
 372. See supra text accompanying note 254. 
 373. The Reporter’s Comments for the Consumer Due Process Protocol state: 
  The most critical element in ADR quality control is the establishment and 
maintenance of standards of competence for Neutrals [arbitrators and mediators] within 
the program.  “Competence” refers to “the acquisition of skills, knowledge and . . . other 
attributes” deemed necessary to assist others in resolving disputes in a particular 
setting. . . . 
  While ensuring the competence of Neutrals is always important, it is particularly 
“critical in contexts when party choice over the process, program or neutral is limited,” a 
reality of many Consumer ADR programs. 
CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 4, Reporter’s Comments (citations omitted) 
(quoting SPIDR, supra note 33, at 5–6). 
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transactional setting, there are special concerns that favor an even-
handed mechanism for identifying potential arbitrators with appropriate 
credentials.  For example, concerns have been raised about the supposed 
built-in biases of employment arbitrators actively engaged in practice on 
behalf of employers or employees.374  A common method for developing 
pools of such candidates is the creation of an advisory committee 
comprised of experienced users.375 
The extensive Reporter’s Comments to the Consumer Due Process 
Protocol state, among other things, that the “qualifications [of arbitrators 
and mediators] are best established by joint efforts of concerned 
‘stakeholders.’”376  They cite various sources recognizing the importance 
of giving consumers “a voice in establishing and maintaining standards 
of competence and quality in ADR programs.”377 
2. Diversity 
The Employment Due Process Protocol calls for the maintenance of 
“a roster of available mediators and arbitrators [to] be established on a 
non-discriminatory basis, diverse by gender, ethnicity, background, 
experience, etc. to satisfy the parties that their interest and objectives will 
be respected and fully considered.”378  Like other disputants, consumers 
seek assurance that decision makers are, among other things, giving 
adequate consideration to their presentations and evidence.379  Recent 
empirical studies examining public and private arbitration support the 
conclusion that the background and gender of decision makers tend to 
affect their approach to disputes.380  It is likely that a consumer would 
                                                          
 374. See Bales & Eviston, supra note 38, at 13 (“The most flagrant problem with arbitral 
selection is when an employer reserves to itself, in the arbitration contract, exclusive or inordinate 
control in selecting the arbitrator or creating the pool of arbitrators.”). 
 375. See supra note 371 and accompanying text. 
 376. CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 4, Reporter’s Comments (citing KAISER 
PERMANENTE ARBITRATION SYSTEM, supra note 361, at 35–36).  The Consumer Due Process 
Protocol also states: “All parties are entitled to competent, qualified Neutrals.  Independent ADR 
Institutions are responsible for establishing and maintaining standards for Neutrals in ADR Programs 
they administer.”  Id. 
 377. See id. 
 378. EMPLOYMENT PROTOCOL, supra note 187, at 3. 
 379. Allen Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, in 
EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 177, 183 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998). 
 380. See generally Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Colorblind Judge: An 
Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117 (2009) (finding judges’ 
race significantly affects outcomes in federal cases). 
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discount the legitimacy of a tribunal with which he does not in some way 
identify.381  Today, considerable effort is being devoted to promote 
diversity on rosters of arbitrators and mediators.382 
3. Experience and Training 
A rating system should also take into account the appropriateness of 
the experiential backgrounds of arbitrators in the program and the 
relative “balance of backgrounds” on individual panels.  Among business 
users, arbitrator expertise is often a prized hallmark of arbitration.383  To 
consumers, however, “technical or professional experience often carries 
with it the perception if not the reality of bias.”384  From the consumer’s 
perspective, an arbitrator who comes from the same commercial or 
professional background as the company on the other side of the dispute 
“may not be the ideal judge.”385  In response to such concerns, BBB Auto 
Line panels are comprised of one or two public arbitrators and possibly a 
technical expert.386  A similar arrangement has for years been the norm in 
securities arbitrations.  But after years of concern by investor-advocates 
about the influence of industry representatives, FINRA recently gave 
investors the option to have a three-member tribunal comprised of 
arbitrators without experience in the securities industry.387  In the future, 
any involvement by “industry” arbitrators will be solely at the election of 
investors.  At the same time, it may be highly desirable for all arbitrators, 
whatever their background, to have training in key legal or procedural 
fundamentals.388 
                                                          
 381. See supra notes 252–53 and accompanying text. 
 382. See Joshua W. Martin, The Next Level: Promoting Diversity in the ADR Arena, 15 
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS. 69, 69 (2007) (describing two practitioners’ efforts to improve 
diversity). 
 383. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 307, at 77–78. 
 384. CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 4, Reporter’s Comments. 
 385. Id. 
 386. See Description and Rules—All States Except California, BBB, http://www.bbb.org/us/ 
auto-line/us-process/#eight (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) (providing information about the BBB 
AUTO LINE). 
 387. See supra text accompanying notes 253. 
 388. The Comments to the Consumer Due Process Protocol state: 
  An Independent ADR Institution’s responsibility for the qualifications of Neutrals in a 
particular Consumer ADR program dictates the development of an appropriate training 
program.  Ideally, the training should include a mentoring program with experienced 
Neutrals as well as coverage of applicable principles of Consumer law.  Successful 
completion of such training should be reflected in the information on prospective 
Neutrals furnished to the parties prior to selection. 
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4. Disclosure and Challenge Mechanism 
Just as the ability to effectively make a choice about arbitration 
presumes adequate information about the process, its workings, and its 
implications, effective choices regarding decision makers presume 
sufficient information regarding their background, affiliations, and 
connections to the parties, and the subject matter of the dispute.389  An 
effective procedure for full, timely disclosure of potential conflicts of 
interest by would-be arbitrators, coupled with the ability to challenge and 
have nominees administratively deselected for cause, is a critical element 
of due process in any form of arbitration.390  At a time when there is 
considerable sensitivity about the implications of relationships between 
arbitrators and “repeat players” in consumer arbitration programs,  
disclosures of both past arbitration experiences in which the same 
company was a party and the results are significant facts.391 
5. Ethics Standards and Complaint Mechanism 
In light of the special trust vested in arbitrators as what one might 
call “fiduciaries of conflict resolution,” some arbitration providers have 
adopted codes of ethics for arbitrators.392  The CPR–Georgetown 
                                                                                                                       
CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 4, Reporter’s Comments (citations omitted) (citing 
Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institutions: A Serious 
Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267, 315 (1995)). 
 389. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 307, at 73–75 (discussing importance of 
arbitrator disclosure of potential conflicts of interest in arbitrator selection process). 
 390. The Consumer Due Process Protocol includes the following policy respecting disclosure 
and challenge: 
Beginning at the time of appointment, Neutrals should be required to disclose to the 
Independent ADR Institution any circumstance likely to affect impartiality, including any 
bias or financial or personal interest which might affect the result of the ADR proceeding, 
or any past or present relationship or experience with the parties or their representatives, 
including past ADR experiences.  The Independent ADR Institution should communicate 
any such information to the parties and other Neutrals, if any.  Upon objection of a party 
to continued service of the Neutral, the Independent ADR Institution should determine 
whether the Neutral should be disqualified and should inform the parties of its decision.  
The disclosure obligation of the Neutral and procedure for disqualification should 
continue throughout the period of appointment. 
CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 3 (emphasis omitted). 
 391. These concerns underlie the California Ethics Standards.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 168–73. 
 392. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N & AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS 
IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/dispute/commercial_disputes.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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Principles for ADR Provider Organizations, the leading community 
guideposts on provider ethics, embrace such steps and call for 
organizations “to help ensure that neutrals affiliated with the ADR 
Provider Organization are familiar with and conduct themselves 
according to prevailing norms of ethical conduct in ADR.”393  The 
Principles also admonish providers to “conduct themselves with integrity 
and even-handedness in the management of their own disputes, finances, 
and other administrative matters.”394  To this end, the Principles endorse 
the concept of organizational ethics standards,395 such as those adopted 
by some providers.396 
The Principles also call for providers to create mechanisms for 
addressing grievances about the organization or individual arbitrators or 
mediators, “disclos[ing] the nature and availability of the mechanisms to 
the parties in a clear, accurate and understandable manner.”397  Such 
mechanisms would be “concerned primarily with complaints about the 
conduct of the neutral, or deficiencies in process and procedures”398 but 
would not serve the role of an appeals process.399 
E. Fair Hearing 
The first abiding principle of the Consumer Due Process Protocol 
states that “[a]ll parties are entitled to a fundamentally-fair ADR process.  
As embodiments of fundamental fairness, these Principles should be 
observed in structuring ADR Programs.”400  Several elements of fairness 
may be discerned from the Protocols and other leading exemplars. 
                                                          
 393. See PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 43 and text accompanying note 
273. 
 394. PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 43, Principle 7. 
 395. Id.  The Principles explain: 
ADR Provider Organizations should consider adopting ethical guidelines for employees 
or other individuals associated with the Organizations who provide ADR management or 
administrative services, addressing such issues as impartiality and fair treatment in ADR 
administration, privacy and confidentiality, and limitations on gifts and financial interests 
or relationships. 
Id. Principle 7 cmt. 2. 
 396. See supra note 275 and accompanying text (discussing AAA organizational ethics 
standards). 
 397. PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 43, Principle 7. 
 398. Id. Principle 7 cmt.  The mechanism would “also provide a fair and impartial process for the 
affected neutral or other individual against whom a grievance has been made.”  Id. Principle 7. 
 399. See id. Principle 7 cmt. (stating that the mechanisms would not provide an appeals process 
to address the outcome of the ADR proceeding). 
 400. CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 1. 
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1. Reasonable Costs and Fees 
Private justice, like public justice, entails real costs.  In private 
systems unsupported by taxpayers, however, a larger portion of the 
transactional costs of justice are internalized.  Requiring consumers to 
bear a significant portion of the administrative costs and fees associated 
with binding arbitration—amounts in excess of typical court fees—raises 
basic access-to-justice issues.401  Therefore, some measures are required 
to ensure that consumers are not forced to bear excessive costs, including 
subsidization of costs by the company that called for arbitration in its 
consumer contract.402 
On the other hand, how a justice system is funded may affect 
perceptions regarding the fairness and independence of the system.  If a 
company completely underwrites the cost of the consumer arbitration 
system in which it contests disputes with consumers, then the consumer 
might view the system as proprietary.  Moreover, there is a potential that 
consumers might view arbitrators as somehow beholden to a party that 
shoulders the substantial burden of fees.403 
                                                          
 401. See Schmitz, supra note 4, at 162–64 (noting that, for example, the AAA refuses to 
administer proceedings where arbitration clauses require consumers to pay all arbitration costs and 
fees). 
 402. The Consumer Due Process Protocol states: 
  In some cases, the need to ensure reasonable costs for the Consumer will require the 
Provider of goods or services to subsidize the costs of ADR which is mandated by the 
agreement.  Indeed, many companies today deem it appropriate to pay most or all of the 
costs of ADR procedures for claims and disputes involving individual employees.  
CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 6 (citation omitted) (citing Mei L. Bickner et al., 
Developments in Employment Arbitration, 52 DISP. RES. J. 8 (1997); Michael F. Altschul & 
Elizabeth S. Stong, AAA Develops New Arbitration Rules to Resolve Wireless Disputes, ADR 
Currents, Fall 1997, at 6).  The Consumer Due Process Protocol also states: 
[I]t may [also] be possible to fulfill the principle of reasonable cost by the use of the 
Internet, the telephone, other electronic media, or through written submissions.  
Abbreviated procedures may be particularly appropriate in the context of small monetary 
claims, where there is always the alternative of a face-to-face hearing in small claims 
court. 
Id. 
 403. The Consumer Due Process Protocol observes: 
At the same time, there are legitimate concerns that having the Provider pay all or a 
substantial portion of neutral’s fees and expenses may undermine the latter’s impartiality.  
For this reason, as observed in the Employment Due Process Protocol, “[i]mpartiality is 
best assured by the parties sharing the fees and expenses of the mediator and arbitrator.”  
Therefore, the Advisory Committee concludes that Consumers should have the option to 
share up to half of the Neutral’s fees and expenses.  In addition, unless the parties agree 
otherwise after a dispute arises, the handling of fee arrangements and the payment of fees 
should be conducted by the Independent ADR Institution.  The latter, “by negotiating the 
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Standards governing cost coverage often attempt to balance these 
concerns in some fashion.  For example, although it is common for 
companies to subsidize fees and costs of arbitration so that consumers 
are not required to pay more than the equivalent of court fees,404 and fee 
waivers may also be permitted in appropriate cases,405 the Consumer Due 
Process Protocol states that consumers should have the option to pay 
more if they so desire.406  A rating system may reasonably take account 
of these concerns. 
2. Legal Counsel 
In some consumer arbitrations, a fair hearing might not be possible 
without the participation of counsel.  Although the exemplars described 
in Part III do not call upon companies to defray consumers’ attorneys’ 
fees in arbitration, they do generally recognize the right of parties to be 
represented by individuals of their choice, including legal counsel.407 
3. Reasonable Hearing Location 
One must consider whether a party has the opportunity to attend the 
hearing when determining whether the hearing is fair.408  For this reason, 
some courts have held that provisions in mandatory arbitration 
agreements that require consumers or employees to travel unreasonable 
                                                                                                                       
parties’ share of costs and collecting such fees, might be able to reduce the bias potential 
of disparate contributions by forwarding payment to the mediator and/or arbitrator 
without disclosing the parties’ share therein. 
Id. (citations omitted) (citing EMPLOYMENT PROTOCOL, supra note 187, Principle 6; Stephen J. 
Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Cassarotto, 31 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1023 (1996)). 
 404. See id. (stating that many court-connected ADR programs are becoming subsidized). 
 405. See id. (stating that some ADR tribunals have employed mechanisms for waiving filing fees 
and administrative expenses). 
 406. The Consumer Due Process Protocol states: 
Consumers should have the option to share up to half of the Neutral’s fees and expenses.  
In addition, unless the parties agree otherwise after a dispute arises, the handling of fee 
arrangements and the payment of fees should be conducted by the Independent ADR 
Institution.  The latter, “by negotiating the parties’ share of costs and collecting such fees, 
might be able to reduce the bias potential of disparate contributions by forwarding 
payment to the mediator and/or arbitrator without disclosing the parties’ share therein.” 
Id. (citing EMPLOYMENT PROTOCOL, supra note 187, Principle 6). 
 407. See id. Principle 9 (stating that “[a]ll parties participating in processes in ADR Programs 
have the right, at their own expense, to be represented by a spokesperson of their own choosing”). 
 408. Id. Principle 7, Reporter’s Comments. 
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distances to a hearing are unenforceable.409  Moreover, arbitration 
fairness standards require a hearing’s location to be reasonably close to 
the consumer.410  JAMS requires that a hearing be made available to the 
consumer “in his or her hometown area.”411 
4. Access to Information and Discovery 
The role of discovery in arbitration is much debated, as it presents 
parties with something of a double-edged sword.  On one hand, parties’ 
access to information and the ability to conduct discovery is often 
necessary to achieving a fair and meaningful outcome.412  Without the 
appropriate facts being brought to light, arbitrators would be left with 
little upon which to make an informed and fair decision.413  This need for 
information, however, must be tempered by the costly nature of 
discovery.  In the name of efficiency, arbitration has traditionally been a 
less formal process than litigation, with simplified discovery contributing 
to shorter cycle time and lower costs.414  Extensive, lengthy discovery 
can restore these burdens, potentially to the detriment of individual 
consumers.  For that reason, fairness in handling discovery involves a 
balancing act. 
Discovery can also be problematic because parties often do not share 
the same ability to gather and analyze information.  A party may not be 
represented by counsel and unable or unwilling to conduct adequate 
discovery.  Having a protocol in place that requires certain information to 
be shared and made available to both parties can be essential to ensuring 
a fair hearing.  Such a protocol might include having an arbitrator  
 
                                                          
 409. See, e.g., Kubis & Perszyk Assocs., Inc. v. Sun Microsys., Inc., 680 A.2d 618, 624–29 (N.J. 
1996). 
 410. The Consumer Due Process Protocol requires that arbitration be held in a “reasonably 
convenient location” for both parties.  CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 7 (emphasis 
omitted). 
 411. JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS, supra note 220. 
 412. The Consumer Due Process Protocol establishes that an inability to gather information 
should never stand in the way of a party receiving a fair hearing.  CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 
33, Principle 13, Reporter’s Comments. 
 413. The importance of access to information in reaching fair outcomes is highlighted in the 
JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations, which requires that an arbitration clause allows for the 
discovery of “non-privileged information relevant to the dispute.”  JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER 
ARBITRATIONS, supra note 220. 
 414. FTC STUDY, supra note 20, at 37. 
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supervise the information exchange between parties to ensure that the 
process is being completed in a fair and even-handed manner.415 
In certain cases, the use of an advisory group that can develop 
appropriate information exchange guidelines may also be helpful.416  For 
example, under FINRA procedures, templates have been established 
detailing exactly what documents parties must produce, given the 
particular matter at hand.417  Because securities cases tend to fall into 
various well-defined categories, such templates serve both efficiency and 
fairness. 
In some cases it may be appropriate or necessary to permit 
depositions.  In employment cases, for example, depositions play an 
important role in information gathering.418 
5. Limitations Period 
Pre-dispute arbitration clauses sometimes include terms prescribing 
how long after the alleged injury a party may file an arbitration claim.  
While limitations periods may create greater certainty by helping to 
protect against frivolous claims, unreasonably short limitations periods 
may diminish the ability of consumers to seek redress for legitimate 
claims.  In order to prevent companies from establishing unreasonable 
limitations periods, which may attempt to take advantage of customers’ 
general lack of knowledge about the need to take their claim to 
arbitration, some fairness standards provide that arbitration limitation 
periods should be no shorter than the statutory limitation period that 
would be available in court.419 
                                                          
 415. The Consumer Due Process Protocol recommends that this arbitrator-supervised process be 
implemented in cases of mandated arbitration for consumer disputes.  CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra 
note 33, Principle 13.  Arbitrators may also have the flexibility to require further discovery if 
deemed necessary later in the arbitration process.  Id. Principle 13, Reporter’s Comments.  This 
flexibility allows for a more simplified discovery process up front, while recognizing the reality that 
some cases will require greater information exchange down the road.  Id. 
 416. Id. 
 417. FINRA provides parties with a discovery guide and document production lists.  See 
CUSTOMER CODE, supra note 246, at 39. 
 418. JAMS Employment Arbitration Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness calls for 
discovery to include the “identification of witnesses” and “one deposition for each side,” with 
additional discovery “at the arbitrator’s discretion.”  JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS, 
supra note 220, Standard No. 4 cmt. 
 419. MODEL ARBITRATION ACT, § I.12 (Proposed Draft 2010) (Submitted by Lew Maltby) (on 
file with author). 
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6. Expeditious Process 
Unreasonable time delays can jeopardize the fairness of 
arbitration.420  Therefore, fairness may require that measures be put in 
place to ensure that arbitration is being carried out in an expeditious 
manner.  Time limits or guidelines established by the arbitration provider 
may help avoid unnecessary delays at each step of the arbitration 
process.421  They may also help protect against abuse of the system, 
wherein a party with greater money and resources might attempt to wear 
down the other with costly delay.  As noted above, the speed and 
efficiency of the arbitration process is heavily dependent on the approach 
the parties and arbitrators take to discovery and information gathering.422 
7. Fair Hearing 
A “fundamentally fair hearing” should be provided to all parties who 
arbitrate.423  A fair hearing requires a transparent process free from bias 
or the appearance of bias.424  Hearings, therefore, must be conducted by 
fair and neutral arbitrators acting within the framework of an established 
protocol that creates the same level playing field for all.425  A fair hearing 
must also be categorized by sufficient notice and the opportunity for both 
parties to appear at the hearing.  While these fundamental elements of 
fairness must be met, arbitration often allows parties flexibility in how 
hearings are conducted.426  This flexibility can be advantageous as long 
as standards of fairness and equal opportunity to be heard are upheld. 
                                                          
 420. See generally THE COLLEGE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS, PROTOCOLS FOR 
EXPEDITIOUS, COST-EFFECTIVE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 22–42 (Thomas J. Stipanowich et al. 
eds., 2010), available at http://www.thecca.net/CCA_Protocols.pdf (discussing and addressing 
concerns about excessive delay and cost in arbitration). 
 421. The Consumer Due Process Protocol calls for reasonable time limits for arbitration 
proceedings.  CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 8. 
 422. See supra Part IV.E.4 (noting the accessibility of services as a rubric for dispute resolution 
services); see also CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 13, Reporter’s Comments 
(discussing binding arbitration and its hallmark in avoiding the cost and delay in extensive pre-
hearing discovery). 
 423. See MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 29, § 32.3.1.1. 
 424. FTC STUDY, supra note 20, at 46. 
 425. According to CPR–Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards of Practice in ADR, 
arbitration providers must take “all reasonable steps” available to ensure their services are impartial 
and fair.  PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 43, Principle 3. 
 426. For example, online dispute resolution may be a suitable format for dispute resolution and 
satisfy the requirements of fairness, even though the parties do not meet in person to arbitrate.  
CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 12, Reporter’s Comments. 
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8. Availability of Class Action 
Class actions, while controversial, have historically been touted as a 
means for plaintiffs with small claims to join their interests together 
when, individually, their claims may have been too small.427  Class 
actions have also been seen as a way to deter companies from bad 
behavior by giving greater power to plaintiffs through collective 
action.428  Now, however, the option of class action is threatened by the 
ability of companies to contract around class actions through the use of 
class action waivers in pre-dispute arbitration clause.  The availability of 
class action suits has become the central issue in the debate over binding 
arbitration provisions in contracts of adhesion.429  These pre-dispute 
clauses now frequently contain terms purporting to waive an individual’s 
ability to participate in a class action.430  In fact, a company’s desire to 
eliminate the possibility of class actions is now cited as the primary, if 
not the sole, motivating factor in including pre-dispute arbitration 
provisions in these contracts.431  The result of class action waiver 
provisions, as one commentator puts it, is that “consumer-plaintiff 
arbitrations . . . essentially never occur.”432 
The recent Supreme Court ruling in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion has raised new concerns as to what options consumers have 
in the face of such class action waivers.433  Concepcion upholds the 
enforceability of class action waivers in pre-dispute arbitration clauses, 
citing the supremacy of the FAA to limit these agreements under state 
unconscionability doctrine.434  To the extent it governs, Concepcion 
enables companies to avoid collective actions in both litigation and 
                                                          
 427. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 336 n.72. 
 428. See id. (discussing opinions of opponents to class-action waivers). 
 429. See id. at 335–36. 
 430. See Schmitz, supra note 4, at 146, 148 (noting widespread use of class action waiver 
provisions in consumer credit card and wireless contracts). 
 431. See id. at 150 (“[C]ompanies use arbitration clauses to limit their vulnerability to consumer 
claims, especially class actions.”). 
 432. Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 1172. 
 433. See 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 434. See id. 1747–51 (2011) (discussing unconscionability and the FAA).  The Court states that 
the policy behind the FAA is to enforce arbitration agreements as written.  Id. at 1748.  Justice 
Scalia’s opinion focuses on advancing the pro-arbitration stance of the FAA, but it expresses little 
concern for how the FAA’s principle of fundamental fairness will be met under these new 
restrictions.  Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 382.  Without the ability of the judiciary to police such 
agreements, fundamental fairness is jeopardized in the name of efficiency.  Id. at 387. 
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arbitration,435 requiring consumers to bring claims individually.  How to 
make this process feasible for the average consumer with a low claim 
amount has yet to be determined.  New developments in the realm of 
online dispute resolution may be able to help address such concerns;436 
meanwhile, waiver provisions raise serious fairness issues.  The 
ameliorative effect of customized provisions such as those in the AT&T 
Mobility contract at issue in Concepcion is the subject of debate.437  It 
may be possible, however, for companies to develop new approaches that 
would to some extent counteract the impact of a class action waiver 
through incentives for individual action, thereby justifying a more 
favorable fairness rating on the Arbitration Fairness Index. 
F. Fair Outcomes (Awards and Remedies) 
1. Access to Remedies Available in Court 
Another measure of fairness in the realm of arbitration is access to 
remedies.  A major flashpoint of concern has been whether parties are 
entitled to receive punitive damages in arbitration.438  Today, however, 
the authority of arbitrators to address punitive damages claims is 
supported by court decisions439 as well as some statutes.440  In addition, 
the Protocols and rules of leading arbitration providers have attempted to 
ensure that parties are eligible to receive the same types of remedies in 
arbitration as those available in court.441  Under current FINRA 
arbitration procedures, for example, punitive awards are an important 
feature of the remedial landscape.442 
                                                          
 435. Stipanowich, supra note 2, 388. 
 436. See supra Part III.G. 
 437. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 371–75 (summarizing judicial treatment of AT&T 
Mobility’s provisions). 
 438. See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle 
Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REV. 953 (1986) (discussing access to punitive damages in 
arbitration proceedings). 
 439. See MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 29, § 36.3. 
 440. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 21(a) (2000) (allowing punitive damages). 
 441. JAMS Policy on Employment Arbitration Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness 
requires that “all remedies that would be available . . . in a court proceeding . . . must remain 
available in arbitration.”  JAMS POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION, supra note 198, Standard 
1.  The Consumer Due Process Protocol contains a similar provision.  CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra 
note 33, Principle 14. 
 442. Choi & Eisenberg, supra note 250, at 511 (noting that reforms to FINRA may “generate 
changes over time in punitive damages award rates”). 
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2.  Publication of Reasoned Awards 
The publication of reasoned awards may promote greater fairness by 
enhancing the transparency of awards and, hopefully, causing arbitrators 
to exercise more care in reaching decisions.443  Providing parties with a 
“why” may also leave parties more satisfied with the process and 
accepting of the result.444  For these reasons, the Consumer Due Process 
Protocol contains a provision calling for a “brief written explanation of 
the basis for the [arbitral] award” upon the request of a party.445 
3. Outcomes 
When it comes to ranking arbitration programs, outcomes are a 
critical element.  Indeed, the Berlin Principles admonish rating 
organizations to “[m]easure outcomes in preference to inputs wherever 
possible.”446  As discussed above, a growing body of empirical research 
has explored a variety of relevant elements in arbitration, including 
consumer awareness and understanding of arbitration provisions,447 
win/loss rates for employees or consumers,448 comparisons between 
outcomes in arbitration and court,449 and consumer perceptions of 
arbitration.450  In developing and implementing an Arbitration Fairness 
Index, such data are an essential complement to collecting information 
on published procedures and policies in arbitration programs. 
                                                          
 443. CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 33, Principle 15, Reporter’s Comments. 
 444. Id. 
 445. Id. Principle 15.  This requirement is also reflected in some commercial arbitration 
procedures.  The CPR Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration of Business Disputes requiring a 
statement explaining the rationale for the award.  INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL., 
CPR PROCEDURES & CLAUSES: NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 13.2, available at 
http://cpadr.org/Portals/O/Resources/ADR%20Tools/Clauses%20&for%2007%20CPR%20Rules%2
0for%20Non-Administered%20Arbitration.pdf. 
 446. See supra text accompanying note 119. 
 447. See, e.g., Schmitz, supra note 4, at 133–39 (surveying empirical arbitration research). 
 448. See, e.g., Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 351, at 845–46 (presenting results from the AAA’s 
empirical study). 
 449. See supra notes 293–94 and accompanying text. 
 450. See generally Gross & Black, supra note 295 (discussing consumer perceptions of securities 
arbitration clauses). 
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V. IMPLEMENTING AN ARBITRATION FAIRNESS INDEX 
Having considered factors that might be relevant and valid elements 
of a template for an Arbitration Fairness Index, we are faced with other 
questions relating to the implementation of an Index: 
1. Can the Index be implemented in a cost-effective manner? 
2. What kind of rating organization should implement the Index, 
and what should be the role of stakeholders and expert 
advisors?  
3. How might relevant, accurate, and representative data be 
developed? 
4. What formats might be used for publication of resulting 
ratings and rankings? 
5. What role will the Index play alongside other sources of 
information about consumer and employment arbitration 
programs? 
We will briefly address each of these subjects in turn. 
A. Cost-Effectiveness 
We have considered a number of public benefits likely to be 
engendered by an Arbitration Fairness Index—a rating system that ranks 
and compares arbitration programs associated with consumer and 
employment contracts.451  At the same time, there are legitimate 
questions about whether the costs of such a program would outweigh the 
benefits or whether a cost-effective method can be found for 
implementation of the program. 
There are potentially significant fixed costs, depending on the 
breadth of the ratings program.  There will be a need for infrastructure to 
obtain information on arbitration procedures, neutrals, and administration 
and actual operation.  The cost of well-designed surveys or sampling of 
users’ experiences or perceptions could also be substantial. 
                                                          
 451. See supra Part II.B. 
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Similarly, there are concerns on the demand side.  It is not clear that 
consumers or their advocates would be willing to pay the cost of such 
guidance unless, for example, it could be presented in tandem with 
ratings of other products or services.  The same may be true of 
information about a company’s employment arbitration system without 
more general information about the company’s workplace environment.  
To the extent that an effort is made to develop a “brand” of sufficient 
reputation to encourage demand, additional costs will be involved.452 
There are reasons, however, to believe that these problems may be 
overcome.  As discussed below, it may be possible for rating 
organizations with established infrastructures that focus more broadly on 
consumer, employee, or corporate social responsibility concerns to serve 
as vehicles for an arbitration rating system.453  Moreover, there appears 
to be significant and sustained interest among scholars and advocates 
regarding consumer and employment arbitration.  An Arbitration 
Fairness Index may provide a focus, directly or indirectly, for their 
energy and scholarly activity, including relevant empirical research on 
outcomes, experiences, and perceptions.454  Finally, it may be possible 
for this effort to be significantly augmented by government agencies, 
notably the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which is 
authorized to develop information regarding the operation of arbitration 
for consumer financial services.455 
                                                          
 452. See Furchtgott-Roth, Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 41, at 85. 
 453. See infra text accompanying notes 459–74. 
 454. See supra Part III.H.  At the initial meeting of the National Roundtable on Consumer and 
Employment Dispute Resolution, held on the Pepperdine campus on Feb. 2–4, 2012, and co-
sponsored by Pepperdine School of Law, the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution, and Penn State 
University Dickinson School of Law, significant interest was demonstrated among attending 
scholars, advocates, and others in the concept of an Arbitration Fairness Index.  A working group 
was created to develop the concept further.  See Nat’l Roundtable on Consumer & Emp’t Dispute 
Resolution, Consumer Arbitration Roundtable Summary Report, AM. BAR ASS’N (Apr. 17, 2012), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-launches-
public-inquiry-into-arbitration-clauses/. 
 455. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.  See 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
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B. Provenance and Control 
1. Models for a Rating System 
Rating organizations depend upon their reputation for their 
success.456  From the standpoint of stimulating corporate interest and 
influencing pertinent corporate behavior, the impact of any third-party 
rating system is likely to correlate directly with the degree of perceived 
power and legitimacy of the system.457  In order for the Arbitration 
Fairness Index to have meaningful impact on consumer awareness and 
corporate behavior, therefore, the standing and character of the 
sponsoring organization(s) is critical. 
As previously noted, it may be feasible for a rating company or 
market research firm to sponsor development and implementation of the 
Index.  While there are thousands of such firms in the United States,458 
we will consider several highly visible organizations that might serve 
that role. 
Consumer Reports, a leading source of information regarding 
products and services, is operated by the non-profit Consumers Union.459  
Consumers Union’s mission is to “work for a fair, just, and safe 
marketplace for all consumers and to empower consumers to protect 
themselves.”460  Consumer Reports National Research Center annually 
surveys a random sample of more than one million consumers regarding 
their experiences with purchased products.461  Consumers Union strongly 
emphasizes that its research program “is free of corporate influence and 
advertising” and that “surveys are not commissioned or financed by 
industry.”462  Like many consumer organizations, Consumers Union has 
adopted fairly strong views opposing the use of binding or mandatory 
                                                          
 456. See, e.g., Furchtgott-Roth, Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 41, at 75 (discussing Nielsen 
Media Research Company’s interest in developing a reputation for sound ratings). 
 457. See Randel, Jaussi & Standifird, supra note 75, at 441 (discussing stakeholder interests). 
 458. See Furchtgott-Roth, Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 41, at 63 (referring to U.S. Census 
Bureau statistics indicating there were 5,359 market research service providers in the United States 
in 2002 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 ECONOMIC CENSUS, PROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND 
TECHNICAL SERVICES 3 (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ec02/ec0254i09.pdf)). 
 459. See About Consumers Union, CONSUMERS UNION, http://www.consumersunion.org/about/ 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
 460. Id. 
 461. How We Survey at Consumer Reports, CONSUMER REP., http://www.consumerreports.org/ 
cro/consumer-reports-national-research-center/overview/index.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2012). 
 462. Id. 
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arbitration provisions in consumer and employment contracts463 and 
supports the passage of the as-yet-unpassed Arbitration Fairness Act.464  
If such provisions continue to be enforceable under federal law, however, 
a publication such as Consumer Reports, with its supporting research 
infrastructure, might afford a particularly suitable platform for a 
consumer-oriented version of an Arbitration Fairness Index. 
A more narrowly focused but much-publicized and increasingly 
preeminent rating program is the Corporate Social Responsibility Index 
(CSRI).  The CSRI was jointly developed by an educational institution, 
the Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship, and a for-profit 
international reputational management consulting company, the 
Reputation Institute.465  The CSRI purports to reflect how companies’ 
reputations are affected by public perceptions of performance related to 
citizenship (the community and the environment), governance (ethics 
and transparency), and workplace practices.466  These three components 
are among seven elements of a larger annual reputational survey 
conducted yearly by the Reputation Institute.467  While the development 
and maintenance of consumer or employment versions of an Arbitration 
Fairness Index would be an undertaking well beyond the scope of the 
research protocol underlying the CSRI, the resulting data would certainly 
be relevant to one or more elements of corporate reputation measured by 
the Reputation Institute.468 
2. Importance of Broad-Based Input and Involvement 
No matter what organization sponsors the Index, its perceived 
viability will hinge on the quality of participation by those being rated, 
                                                          
 463. See Press Release, Consumers Union, Groups Launch Nationwide Effort to Stop Use of 
Binding Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: Campaign Includes Educational Web Sites, Call for State 
and Federal Legislation, Tools to Empower Consumers (Feb. 24, 2005), available at 
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core_financial_services/002025.html. 
 464. See Letter from Numerous Companies to Honorable Patrick Leahy, Chairman, and 
Honorable Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary (May 17, 
2011), available at http://www.afj.org/connect-with-the-issues/civil-justice/letter-in-support-of-
arbitration-fairness-act_may-2011.pdf. 
 465. See supra text accompanying notes 79–81. 
 466. See supra text accompanying notes 81–83. 
 467. See supra text accompanying notes 79–83. 
 468. The fairness of a company’s consumer arbitration program would seem to be directly 
relevant to the governance aspect, and the fairness of corporate dispute resolution procedures for 
employment disputes would be relevant to the workplace aspect.  See infra text accompanying note 
509. 
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those with relevant expertise, and other stakeholders.  The Berlin 
Principles emphasize the importance of involvement by different 
stakeholder groups in rating systems, stating that “[i]nstitutions that are 
being ranked and the experts that inform the ranking process should be 
consulted often.”469  In addition, the Principles call for rating 
organizations to “be as objective and impartial as possible” in the 
collection and use of data.470 
The makeup of the “rating constituency” is very important for a 
couple of reasons.  First, it should be recognized that views of what 
standards and methods of measurement are appropriate are likely to be 
affected by one’s position as a producer or consumer, seller or buyer, or 
employer or employee, and these differences in perspective should  
ideally be reflected in the deliberations leading to the development and 
implementation of the Index.471 
In this regard, efforts to create broad-based, balanced advisory 
groups in connection with the development of due process protocols,472 
and the evolution of policies and procedures for securities arbitration,473 
offer general models.  An Index advisory group would presumably 
include a carefully balanced aggregate of consumer and employee 
advocates, representatives of rated companies, and arbitration experts—
including scholars with extensive and relevant empirical research 
experience.474 
3. Role of Government 
Although it is appropriate to consider what, if any, role government 
agencies should play in conducting or supervising a rating program, the 
                                                          
 469. See RANKING SYSTEMS, supra note 107, at 52. 
 470. Id. at 53. 
 471. See Furchtgott-Roth, Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 41, at 73–74 (discussing competing 
interests and political efforts between users and vendors in the TV ratings context). 
 472. See supra text accompanying note 371 (discussing advisory committee models). 
 473. See supra text accompanying notes 245–47 (discussing the National Arbitration and 
Mediation Committee). 
 474. There are also examples of custom-built, non-profit rating organizations with broad-based 
support and involvement.  For example, in 1963 “[a] number of [television] industry players . . . 
formed the Broadcast Rating Council Inc.,” with membership including various media groups as 
well as major networks.  Furchtgott-Roth, Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 41, at 69.  These have 
been supplemented by cablecast companies, advertisers and ad agencies, and internet organizations.  
Id.  The Rating Counsel was aimed at setting criteria and standards for ratings, ensuring that the 
ratings were “valid, reliable, effective, and viable” while accrediting ratings providers and ensuring 
their conformance to standards.  Id. at 69–71. 
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benefits of such an arrangement are not clear and an extensive treatment 
of this subject must be left for another time.  Regulatory oversight of a 
private system would entail additional costs, and in some cases—such as 
a regulatory licensure or certification process for rating firms—might 
actually discourage entry into the “ratings market” by new firms.475 
Although it is unlikely that there will be competition to produce and 
provide ratings of consumer and employment arbitration programs,476 
there is evidence that in most sectors of the economy, rating services 
tend to be highly concentrated, with relatively few firms providing 
ratings.477  Rating services are generally not subject to regulation, and 
even in heavily regulated arenas like the workplace and environmental 
testing, rating methods are left to rating firms.478 
On the other hand, agencies such as the CFPB may play an important 
part in obtaining case statistics and other information on arbitration 
programs that will be critical to meaningful development of an 
Arbitration Fairness Index.479 
C. Accuracy, Representativeness, and Utility of Data 
As previously noted, it is critical to have a rating system that reflects 
general agreement on what should be measured and what standards 
should be applied.480  Leading principles for rating systems state that 
rankings “should provide clarity about the range of information sources  
                                                          
 475. Id. at 79–80 (discussing perceptions of the impact of SEC licensing of bond rating firms). 
 476. Cf. id. at 65–68 (noting potential for competition in the TV ratings industry and contrasting 
the ratings industry in foreign countries). 
 477. See id. at 83–87 (providing and explaining a chart of rating firms utilized in several 
different industries). 
 478. Id. at 86–87. 
 479. The CFPB has authority to obtain information on arbitration programs.  See Stipanowich, 
supra note 2, at 404–05.  For example, the CFPB recently requested the following information about 
arbitration clauses from the public: “The prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer financial 
products and services”; “What claims consumers bring in arbitration against financial services 
companies”; “If claims are brought by financial services companies against consumers in 
arbitration”; “How consumers and companies are affected by actual arbitrations”; and “How 
consumers and companies are affected by arbitration clauses outside of actual arbitrations.”  Press 
Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Launches Public 
Inquiry into Arbitration Clauses (Apr. 24, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/press 
releases/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-launches-public-inquiry-into-arbitration-clauses/.  
Critics of mandatory arbitration have expressed hope that this initiative will help address related 
concerns.  Peter Andrew, Time to Fix the Arbitration System?, FOX BUS. (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2012/01/24/time-to-fix-arbitration-system/. 
 480. See supra text accompanying note 129. 
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for rankings” and that a variety of courses should be taken to obtain 
information “in order to get a more complete view.”481 
Today, much negative publicity has been generated by the failure of 
rating systems to provide fair and accurate information.  U.S. News & 
World Report is roundly criticized for, among other things, overreliance 
on data provided by the rated institutions.482  Nielsen ratings have been 
targeted as unrepresentative samples483 that discriminate against minority 
TV viewers and use faulty sampling methods.484  The utility of the 
Arbitration Fairness Index will relate directly to the quality, accuracy, 
and representativeness of the information on which ratings are based. 
1. Published Information 
Much information on individual corporate arbitration programs is 
available in print or online.  Pertinent contractual language, incorporated 
arbitration procedures, lists of potential arbitrators, and other relevant 
materials should be available from subject companies or the 
organizations providing arbitration services for the company.  While 
these materials may be helpful in rating the fairness of a company’s 
arbitration program, they do not provide a complete picture.  In order to 
understand how the program actually operates, further investigation will 
be necessary.  This may include interviews with company personnel or 
third parties responsible for maintaining helplines or administering 
dispute resolution processes.  Ideally, it will also include statistics on the 
arbitration caseload and information on user experiences and 
perceptions. 
2. Case Statistics and Outcomes 
The Berlin Principles call for rating organizations to “[m]easure 
outcomes in preference to inputs whenever possible.”485  It may be 
possible to acquire statistics on cases submitted to arbitration under the 
                                                          
 481. See supra text accompanying note 115.  
 482. See, e.g., Martha Neil, US News Won’t Recalibrate Law School Rankings Despite Word of 
More U of Illinois Data Errors, ABAJOURNAL.com (Sept. 29, 2011, 6:12 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/us_news_wont_recalibrate_law_school_rankings/. 
 483. Furchtgott-Roth, Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 41, at 57–59 (discussing the 
complexities of obtaining representative sampling from Nielsen ratings). 
 484. Id. at 53. 
 485. See RANKINGS SYSTEMS, supra note 107, at 4. 
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contractual procedures; these may be available from the arbitration 
provider.486  In response to the disclosure requirements of the California 
Ethics Standards, for example, the AAA has posted a complete listing of 
all cases submitted to its administration under its various consumer 
arbitration rules and its Employment Dispute Resolution Rules.487  The 
AAA data compilation includes information on: (1) the identity of the 
business party; (2) the type of dispute; (3) the salary range of the 
individual party, if available; (4) the identity of the prevailing party; (5) 
an indication of whether or not the individual was represented by 
counsel; (6) the date on which the arbitration demand was filed; (7) the 
disposition date; (8) the type of disposition (settlement, award, etc.); (9) 
the amount claimed by the business; (10) the amount claimed by the 
individual party; (11) the total administrative fee paid to the AAA; (12) 
the fee amount allocated to and paid by each party; (13) the award 
amount for the business or individual; (14) other relief; (15) the AAA 
case ID number; (16) the identity of the arbitrator; and (17) the date on 
which the arbitrator was appointed.488  Similar information on consumer 
and employment cases is provided by JAMS, Inc; JAMS also includes 
the names of the parties’ counsel, if any, and a tabulation of the number 
of cases JAMS has heard for either party.489 
If possible, efforts should be made to ascertain the accuracy of such 
information.  The Berlin Principles caution against overreliance on data 
that cannot be audited and verified.490 
3. Outcomes: Experiential and Perceptual Data 
Although considerable data relevant to an Arbitration Fairness Index 
may be derived from existing published materials and case statistics, a 
complete picture of an arbitration program cannot be obtained without 
data from individuals who have actual experiences with the arbitration 
program being rated. 
One approach that might be employed is a broad-based consumer 
survey designed to assemble customer experiences and related 
                                                          
 486. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 266. 
 487. See Consumer Arbitration Statistics, supra note 173.  The AAA data are compiled on an 
extensive Excel spreadsheet.  Although the format is unwieldy for casual users, it facilitates 
statistical research on the data. 
 488. See id. 
 489. See JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS, supra note 220. 
 490. See RANKINGS SYSTEMS, supra note 107, at 53. 
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perceptions.  Surveys of this kind are conducted annually by the 
Consumer Reports National Research Center.491  Comprised of twenty 
trained social scientists, the Center surveys more than one million 
consumers each year regarding their experiences with various products 
and services using many different versions of the survey instrument 
tailored to different purposes.492 
The National Research Center supplements consumer surveys with 
efforts to simulate the consumer experience with products.  Staff 
“mystery shoppers” anonymously buy the products at retail outlets 
throughout the Northeast or online.493  The products are then subjected to  
                                                          
 491. See How We Survey at Consumer Reports, supra note 461. 
 492. Id.  Annual Questionnaires (AQ) are distributed to more than seven million Consumer 
Reports and ConsumerReports.org subscribers, in more than fifty different versions.  Id.  Consumer 
Reports receives responses from a random sample group of more than one million subscribers, who 
review many products and services, including about 1.3 million motor vehicles.  Id.; Annual 
Questionnaire, CONSUMER REP. (last visited Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.consumerreports.org/ 
cro/consumer-reports-national-research-center/annual-questionnaire/index.htm.  The AQ provides 
the data for Consumer Reports articles summarizing subscriber ratings of various kinds of service 
providers.  See Annual Questionnaire, supra.  These include “hotels, restaurants, supermarkets, 
chain restaurants, auto/home insurance, telecommunications, home improvement, electronics, and 
appliance retailers. . . . Some recent reports include hospital visits, mental health experiences, and 
[r]atings of drugstore pharmacies.”  Id. 
Another relevant model is the Corporate Social Responsibility Index (CSRI), which uses broad 
annual surveys on consumer perceptions to rank the companies in the United States that the public 
distinguishes for corporate social responsibility.  THE 2011 CSRI 50, supra note 69.  Rankings are 
based on a 100-point scale.  See Wilson, supra note 81.  Two hundred eighty-five companies were 
measured in the 2011 [CSRI], of which “[ten companies] rated scores of [seventy-five] or higher to 
place them in the excellent category and another [fifty-seven] scored [seventy] or more to reach the 
strong category.  Id.  Among the top [fifty], every company scored 71.1 or higher.”  Id.  The top ten 
companies were: Publix Super Markets Inc., Google, UPS, Kellogg’s, Amazon.com, Berkshire 
Hathaway, FedEx, Campbell Soup Company, Baxter International, and 3M.  THE 2011 CSRI 50, 
supra note 69.  As discussed above, the CSRI ranking is determined by how the public perceives a 
company in three dimensions: citizenship, governance, and workplace.  See id. 
Rankings in the 2011 CSRI were “created using data collected for Reputation Institute’s Global 
Pulse 2011, which was conducted in January 2011” through a survey of 7,790 online consumers in 
the United States.  See Wilson, supra note 81. 
A Pulse score is a measure of corporate reputation calculated by averaging perceptions of 
four indicators of trust, esteem, admiration and good feeling obtained from a 
representative sample of at least 100 respondents who were familiar with the 
company. . . . 
  Each of the 7,790 respondents surveyed for the 2011 [CSRI] was allowed to rate a 
maximum of five companies with which they were familiar, resulting in a total of 24,977 
ratings of 285 selected companies.  All companies were rated by at least 100 respondents. 
Id.  “Possible scores ranged from a low of 0 to a high of 100.”  Id. 
 493. See How We Test: Appliances & Home Products, CONSUMER REP., 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/how-we-test/home-appliances/overview/index.htm (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2012). 
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“tests that re-create the experience [consumers will] have with the 
product.”494  Testing takes into account relevant industry standards.495 
Arbitration Fairness Index ratings should be based in part on the 
experiences of individuals who are subject to a company’s consumer or 
employment arbitration agreements and who had relevant claims or 
disputes with the company.  Surveys should assess, among other things, 
their level of awareness of the arbitration agreement and understanding 
of its consequences, ability to pursue and redress claims, and level of 
satisfaction with the dispute resolution process.  If few or no claims are 
arbitrated under a contract, the reasons for that result should be clearly 
understood by the rating organization. 
4. Quality Assurance 
The Berlin Principles call upon rating programs to “apply measures 
of quality assurance to rankings processes.”496  It has been said that 
ranking programs “should take note of the expertise that is being applied 
to evaluate [the rated] institutions and use this knowledge to evaluate the 
ranking itself.”497  Furthermore, “[r]ankings should be learning systems 
that continuously apply this expertise to develop methodology.”498  To 
ensure the highest quality and a workable format for evaluation, it may 
be appropriate to conduct a pilot program at the outset.  The rating 
organization should also consider the possibility of ranking a few 
representative programs each year or limiting rankings to one or two 
kinds of consumer contracts. 
D. Formats for Publication and Publicity 
The Berlin Principles suggest that consumers should be given a 
choice regarding the way rankings are displayed.499  The Consumers 
Union offers product ratings and information in several different formats 
including the Consumer Reports monthly magazine, a website 
(ConsumerReports.org), and ShopSmart monthly magazine.500 
                                                          
 494. Id. 
 495. Id. 
 496. See RANKING SYSTEMS, supra note 107, at 4. 
 497. Id. 
 498. Id. 
 499. Id. at 53. 
 500. See About Consumers Union, supra note 459; see also ShopSmart, CONSUMER REP., 
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The CSRIs are publicized on the Center for Corporate Citizenship 
website.501  In order to draw extra attention to the rankings, the Center 
gives special recognition to “The CSRI 50”—the top fifty U.S. 
corporations in the CSRI ratings.502  In addition, the CSRI also compares 
ratings from year-to-year in order to report significant improvement or 
decline of specific companies.503  It draws particular attention to “movers 
and shakers”—those companies that moved up more than five points in 
the CSRI rankings from one year to another.504  It also lists the twenty-
five top-rated companies in each of the three “social responsibility 
dimensions” of workplace, governance, and citizenship.505  Finally, it 
graphically depicts the “linear relationship” between public perceptions 
of a company’s social responsibility rating and their overall reputation as 
captured in the Global Reputation Pulse study.506 
Arbitration Fairness Index rankings should be published annually 
and made broadly available in print—perhaps as a prominent element of 
a popular magazine aimed at consumers such as Consumer Reports—and 
online.  The most highly ranked programs could be singled out for 
approbation, and the programs with the lowest scores could also be 
identified.  A variety of explanatory devices could be used to highlight 
key differences between better and poorer arbitration programs and 
promote greater general public understanding of how different arbitration 
programs work.  The publication of the rankings could be widely 
promoted online and on television. 
E. Rating System as Complementary to Other Sources of Information 
The Berlin Principles state that while “[r]ankings can provide 
comparative information and improved understanding” of rated 
programs, they should be viewed as complementary to other sources of 
information about the programs.507  Accordingly, the Arbitration Fairness 
                                                                                                                       
http://Shopsmartmag.org (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
 501. See Corporate Reputation and Social Responsibility Rankings, BOSTON COLL. CENTER FOR 
CORP. CITIZENSHIP, http://www.bcccc.net/index.cfm?pageId=2202 (last visited Mar. 7, 2012). 
 502. See id. 
 503. See id. (sharing reports from prior years). 
 504. See THE 2011 CSRI 50, supra note 69. 
 505. See, e.g., BOSTON COLL. CENTER FOR CORP. CITIZENSHIP & REPUTATION INST., THE 2010 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY INDEX 3 (2010), available at http://www.bcccc.net/pdf/ 
CSRIReport2010.pdf. 
 506. See, e.g., id. at 6. 
 507. See RANKING SYSTEMS, supra note 107, at 51–52. 
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Index will be but one of numerous current initiatives by scholars, 
advocacy groups, provider organizations, and government agencies in the 
challenging realm of consumer and employment arbitration.  Hopefully, 
however, it will provide a useful and unique resource for the edification 
and guidance of consumers, companies, providers of dispute resolution 
services, and regulators.  If the Index proves its utility, moreover, it is 
conceivable that the garnering of a particular score on the Arbitration 
Fairness Index may someday operate as a “trustmark” for a corporate 
dispute resolution program.508 
As a complementary standard, a viable Index may influence other 
ratings of businesses, including those of the Better Business Bureau and 
the CSRI.  The latter, for example, rates companies on the basis of 
whether the business is “run in a fair and transparent fashion,” whether 
“stakeholders [such as consumers] associate the company with high 
ethical business standards,” and whether employees are treated fairly.509  
The fairness of a corporation’s consumer and employment dispute 
resolution programs are surely important factors in all of these 
determinations. 
The Arbitration Fairness Index might also complement the work of 
the new CFPB,510 both benefitting from information developed under the 
auspices of the Bureau and contributing to the sum of knowledge 
respecting arbitration programs under contracts for consumer financial 
services. 
One final, critical point should be made.  As important as it is to 
examine and evaluate arbitration programs, a complete appreciation of 
their role in resolving consumer and employment disputes requires 
comparison to the usual “default option”—going to court.511  In some 
circumstances, as reflected in the recent Federal Trade Commission 
study of public and private resolution of debt collection cases, neither 
option is a truly satisfactory one.512 
                                                          
 508. Cf. Amy J. Schmitz, “Drive-Thru” Arbitration in the Digital Age: Empowering Consumers 
Through Binding ODR, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 178, 237–40 (2010) (discussing use of trustmark system 
to assure users of effective ODR). 
 509. See THE 2011 CSRI 50, supra note 69. 
 510. See supra text accompanying note 479. 
 511. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 423. 
 512. See FTC STUDY, supra note 20. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
If justice is to be administered as a private service, should it not be 
subject to monitoring, evaluation, grading, and ranking like other goods 
and services?  Given the fact that binding arbitration serves as the 
adjudicative backdrop for consumer disputes or employer–employee 
conflict, the choice of arbitration and the kind of justice available under 
arbitration agreements may be every bit as important as consumer 
warranties and other substantive rights and remedies set forth in the 
contract.  Yet consumers and employees tend to know very little about 
arbitration and how it affects their rights and obligations; corporate 
arbitration programs are an arcane and little-understood domain.  Recent 
Supreme Court decisions have heightened concerns about the degree of 
effective judicial oversight of consumer and employment arbitration 
under binding pre-dispute agreements; efforts to address such concerns 
are largely stymied by a political logjam. 
It is time to promote the development of an effective Arbitration 
Fairness Index that shines a light on these processes and enhances 
understanding and awareness of the use and impact of arbitration 
programs, among several other potential benefits.  There are a number of 
very useful exemplars from which the elements of an Index may be 
constructed, and significant current interest and concern that may provide 
momentum for its creation and implementation.  Although there are 
significant challenges associated with obtaining the several sources of 
information that will underpin program ratings, the result will be a 
unique and valuable resource that raises consciousness of arbitration 
programs to a new, more appropriate level. 
